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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation analyzes the interaction between governments and markets when
governments have the intention to either spend or raise public funds. It is an elaboration
on the role of the State albeit not in a political but economic dimension using analytical
tools of economic theory. The dissertation covers two aspects of public finance: the
effect of government spending and the design of revenue generation mechanisms. First,
in a joint study with Anto´nio Afonso and Hans Peter Gru¨ner we inquire whether the
impact of government spending on GDP differs during financial crises and normal times.
Second, we ask what is the optimal way for governments to raise revenue from returns
to capital: controlling investments or providing incentives. And third, we consider how
revenue generation is affected by skill heterogeneity across entrepreneurs.
From a practical perspective, the objective of these three chapters is to contribute
to a better understanding of government intervention into the economy for instance
when drafting fiscal stimulus packages or when considering how to collect revenues from
resource extracting companies. From a theoretical perspective, the studies examine
situations in which self-regulation of markets can fail and what the government’s
potential is to improve upon via budgetary operations.
The economics discipline departs from the strong belief in the power of markets
with the two famous welfare theorems being valid working hypotheses. It is also well
known that the underlying assumptions fail to hold in many aspects of economic
activity. Most prominently, this is the case when information is imperfect, i.e. when
there is private information on some variables or uncertainty over future outcomes.
Although information asymmetries became a popular field of study much later,
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2Keynes challenging the view on the self-regulation power of markets formulated an
interesting idea on information imperfection. He made a key distinction between risk
and uncertainty: risk is when probabilities can be measured and uncertainty exists when
they cannot be measured i.e. when the future is unknowable (see Skidelsky (2011))
calling for governmental support for the economy. This dissertation tests Keynesian
uncertainty when looking at government spending and picks up his notion of risk
when looking at revenue generation. In particular, it inquires the role of the state
and government action - spending and raising revenue - in such environment.
The dissertation was written during the great recession triggered by the 2008
financial crisis and the ensuing debt crisis. With governments contemplating on the size
of their stimuli an essential research question for the economics discipline was to know
to what extent government spending can indeed contribute to mitigate an economic
downturn in the short run. The literature on fiscal multipliers is very extensive - as
tentatively summarized in Section 2.2 - and our contribution to this field is threefold.
First, we explicitly challenge the Keynesian theory and test whether government
spending has a larger impact during times of financial turmoil, when crowding out
of private consumption is less likely and uncertainty is larger, than during normal
times. Second we use panel analysis for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries for
the period 1981-2007 while most of the previous studies have referred to single country
analyses or advanced countries only. And third, we instrument spending growth by a
combination of variables covering the political budget cycle and budgetary room for
manoeuvre.
Our results point towards relatively low multipliers and no strengthening of a
Keynesian effect from government spending during financial crises. The fiscal multiplier
for the full sample for instrumented regular and crisis spending is about 0.6 considering
the sample average government spending share of GDP of about one third. Altogether,
we cannot reject the hypothesis that crisis spending and regular spending have the
same impact using a variation of controls, sub-samples and specifications.
While Chapter 2 examines the effect of spending State money, Chapters 3 and 4
analyze the impact of government policies when raising money, in other words when
taxing individual returns. As learned in particular from the recent crisis, spending
money is less controversial than raising it. Why the government needs to raise money at
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all is already subject to ideological views. But even when considering a night watchman
state a` la Nozick (see, for instance Nozick (1974)), which might be the smallest common
denominator across most schools of thought, there is a basic financing need of the
government, for instance for the military, police, and legislatures. Taken this as given,
revenue collection for these basic needs should still be done in a most efficient way.
This is the objective of the second and third chapters of the dissertation in which a
revenue generation mechanism is designed for different sizes of basic or not so basic
needs.
In Chapter 3, we study the optimal taxation of entrepreneurial returns when
capital investment is private information. Facing an external revenue requirement, the
government can decide between two options: incentive provision and control of capital
investments. On the one hand, the government can design a tax schedule which provides
appropriate incentives for entrepreneurs to invest the socially optimal level of their
endowments. This implies a welfare loss that stems from the costs of incentive provision.
On the other hand, the government has the possibility to control capital input and pay
monitoring costs. Comparing the nature of these two cost structures, we find that the
government’s decision whether to interfere into the control rights of firms depends on
three parameters: the external revenue requirement, the entrepreneurs’ preferences for
insurance and the monitoring costs of capital.
Chapter 4 extends our previous study on revenue generation and takes an
additional source of private information into account: the skill level of entrepreneurs.
We are thus able to study revenue generation in a more diverse economy. In particular,
we are interested to see which group of entrepreneurs is more likely to me controlled.
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Chapter 2
Fiscal Policy and Growth: Do
Financial Crises make a
Difference?1
2.1 Introduction
In 2008-2009 the world was hit by what many people now believe is one of the deepest
financial crises in modern history. This view relates both to the aggregate volume of
non-performing loans (mainly in the housing sector) and to the fact that international
financial linkages almost immediately lead to contagion effects around the globe. In
the response to these developments, governments around the world initiated huge fiscal
stimulus packages. According to the IMF (2009), the US announced the implementation
of discretionary fiscal measures of 3.8 percent of GDP in 2009-2010, and the European
Union unveiled a European Economic Recovery Plan encompassing a planned two
hundred billion Euro fiscal stimulus package. For the OECD, the accumulated budget
impact of the stimulus package over 2008-2010 reaches 2.5 percent of GDP2 (OECD
(2009)).
Many economists support these measures, including well known scholars such as
Paul Krugman or Joseph Stiglitz. But also economists who were previously opposed to
1This chapter is joint work with Anto´nio Afonso and Hans Peter Gru¨ner
2In addition, the headline support for the financial sector is estimated (IMF (2009)), for instance,
at 3.7% of GDP in Germany, 6.3% in the US, and 19.8% in the UK.
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6active stabilization policies seem to be in support of such policies under the current -
exceptional - circumstances3.
These new policy measures contrast with the results of recent empirical research
on the potential impact of debt-financed fiscal policy measures (such as spending
programs and tax reductions) on economic growth. There is a wide body of literature
which carefully studies the size of fiscal multipliers. The common conclusion of this
literature is that there are significant effects of fiscal policy on output4. Nevertheless,
many papers also conclude that the size of these effects is rather small and the estimated
multipliers of government spending or tax reduction are below one. Moreover, in many
countries the multipliers declined over the 1980s and 1990s. Taking into account that
any debt-financed fiscal stimulus package has to be repaid later on (with interest
payments) one may have serious doubts in the usefulness of such policy measures.
However, one may argue that times of financial crises are different from normal
times. Indeed, there are some good reasons to believe that the economy reacts
differently to discretionary fiscal policy in a financial crisis than during normal times.
First, there are some theoretical contributions which distinguish between more classical
and more Keynesian regimes on output and labor markets (e.g. Malinvaud (1979),
Benassy (1986)). A classical situation would be one, where unemployment is generated
by excessive real wages while output markets are in equilibrium. A more Keynesian
regime is one where unemployment and excess capacities coexist. There are disequilibria
both on labor and on output markets. One can argue that in such a situation a fiscal
stimulus may become more effective, replacing declining private demand for goods and
so stimulating private demand for labor. One could view the public provision of private
goods as a replacement for the private provision of these goods. In this case the state
would take consumers’ decisions in their place and run a higher deficit that later on
would have to be repaid in form of taxes by these consumers. Such a policy might have
strong crowding-out effects in a situation where capacities are already exhausted, but
3In 2008, the German council of economic advisors recently proposed to raise government spending
by 1 percent of GDP in order to stimulate the economy, a measure that hardly would have found its
support in recent years.
4See, for instance, Fata´s and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004),
de Arcangelis and Lamartina (2003), Gal´ı et al. (2007), Afonso and Claeys (2008), Afonso and Furceri
(2010), Afonso and Alegre (2011), and Afonso and Sousa (2009).
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this need not be the case when there are excess capacities in the economy.
A second argument in favor of discretionary fiscal policy is that a liquidity
trap is associated with financial crises and that ”the only policy that still works
is fiscal policy” (both Krugman and Stiglitz advocate that). Most importantly, one
can argue that financial crisis cut off many consumers and producers from bank
lending. During the current crises, the growth rate of lending to the private sector
has fallen significantly. This may have two effects on the effectiveness of fiscal policy
measures. First, government transfers or tax reductions may result directly in increased
consumption of relatively poor, credit constrained consumers. Along these lines Gal´ı
et al. (2007) recently calculated larger fiscal policy multipliers when more consumers
spend their current income. Second, government purchases directly affect the survival
of some firms.
Therefore, it is an interesting question whether the emergence of a systemic
financial crisis changes the way in which fiscal policy measures affect the economy.
This is the question that we want to address in this empirical research. We assess to
what extent in the existence of financial crises, government spending can contribute
to reduce observed output losses and to foster economic growth. We employ a panel
analysis for a set of OECD and non-OECD countries for the period 1981-2007.
Since causality may run in both directions, from government spending to GDP
and from GDP to government spending, we instrument government spending by using
a variable that is based on the distance to the next or, respectively, to the last
democratic election as an instrument in our analysis. Moreover, we also use the past
government budget balance-to-GDP ratio as an additional instrument. We perform
each specification and sub-sample with a 1-year and with a 2-year definition of financial
crisis, with and without time fixed effects.
Overall, our main result is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that crisis
spending and spending in the absence of a financial crisis have the same impact
throughout our study using a variation of controls, sub-samples and specifications.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section two reviews the related
literature. Section three briefly presents our empirical methodology. Section four reports
and discusses the results of the empirical analysis. Section five concludes the chapter.
82.2 Related Literature
A theoretical model that establishes a relationship between credit constraints and the
effects of fiscal policy is Gal´ı et al. (2007). They develop a sticky price model, in which
a certain fraction of households always consume their current income. These ”rule-of-
thumb consumers” coexist with Ricardian consumers. The larger the share of rule-of-
thumb (non-Ricardian) consumers the larger is the effect of fiscal policy on output and
consumption. One may think of these consumers as credit constrained individuals -
or as individuals with no access to financial markets at all5. Therefore, one can view
that study as supporting a link between credit market conditions and fiscal policy
effectiveness. In addition, a calibration of such a model produces relatively large deficit
spending multipliers.
The idea that credit frictions have an impact on the way in which policy shocks
affect the economy is also well known in monetary economics. An important earlier
contribution that links credit market imperfections with the impact of policy shocks
is Bernanke et al. (1999). They consider moral hazard in the lending relationships
between financial intermediaries and firms and between households and intermediaries.
These imperfections strengthen the impact of macroeconomic shocks on output but
also the impact of policy responses. Therefore, the study supports the view that policy
interventions work better when credit markets are not working well.
The present chapter is related to the empirical literature that studies the effects
of fiscal policy on output growth in ”normal times”. For instance, Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) initially applied structured VAR techniques to the measurement of
fiscal policy effects on output and private consumption in the U.S., and Perotti (2004)
extended their analysis to other OECD countries. Blanchard and Perotti find a fiscal
stimulus in the US with multipliers ranging from 0.66 to 0.9. However, they also found
that the effects of fiscal policies declined in the 1980s. Some multipliers have become
insignificant, others even negative. Benassy-Quere and Cimadomo (2006) argue that
5The separation between Ricardian and non-Ricardian households, which have a higher propensity
to consume, is quite paramount in the policy discussion, being notably one of the arguments used in
support of recent fiscal stimuli packages implemented by the authorities in Europe. For the euro area
the share of non-Ricardian households has been estimated around 25-35% by Ratto et al. (2009) and
Forni et al. (2009).
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domestic fiscal policy multipliers have been declining in the U.S. (since the 1970s) and
in Germany (since the 1980s), and that ”cross-border” multipliers (from Germany to
seven EU economies) have been diminishing6.
There is also an ongoing debate in the empirical literature about the role of
exogenous expansion in government spending on consumption and real wages. Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) find that, following an expansionary fiscal policy shock, output rises
while private consumption falls (crowding out). Blanchard and Perotti (2002) instead
find that output and consumption both increase. The main methodological difference
is that Ramey and Shapiro use war build-ups as exogenous dates to identify fiscal
expansions while Blanchard and Perotti use identifying restrictions which they derive
from delays in the response of fiscal policy decisions to the economic development.
Case studies such as Johnson et al. (2006) also provide valuable insights into the
effect of particular spending programs on individual consumption.
For the EU, and using panel data for the 15 ”old” EU countries for the period
1971-2006, Afonso and Alegre (2011) identify a negative impact of public consumption
and social security contributions on economic growth, and a positive impact of public
investment. They also uncover the existence of a crowding-in effect of public investment
into private investment that provokes an overall positive effect of public investment on
economic growth. More recently, using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression
approach for the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Italy, Afonso and Sousa (2009) show
that government spending shocks, in general, have a small but positive effect on GDP,
have a varied effect on private consumption and private investment, reflecting the
existence of important ”crowding-out” effects, and in general, impact positively on the
price level and on the average cost of refinancing the debt.
For the case of the U.S., Cogan et al. (2009), find that the government spending
multipliers from permanent increases in federal government purchases are lower in
new Keynesian models than in old Keynesian models. The differences are quite large
regarding estimates of the impact on the future development of U.S. government
spending in a fiscal package such as the one of February 2009. On the other hand
6Brusselen (2010) provides a broad overview of the effectiveness of fiscal policy, and an evaluation
of fiscal multipliers in VAR, macroeconometric models and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
models.
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Blanchard et al. (2009) argue that the content of the fiscal packages put in place in
2008-2009 by the major developed economies, with targeted tax cuts and transfers are
likely to have the highest multipliers.
Related to the 2008 financial crisis Team (2008) argued that fiscal expansion
must ”now play a central role in sustaining domestic demand.” A similar argument
was previously put forward by Krugman (2005) who argued that fiscal expansion is
quite possible when economic downturns last for several years and low interest rates
reduce monetary policy effectiveness. Nevertheless, Cerra and Saxena (2008) report
that a financial crisis tends to depress long-run growth, which may cast some doubts
on the short-term effectiveness of fiscal policies under such circumstances.
For a panel of 19 OECD countries, Tagkalakis (2008) finds that in the presence
of liquidity constrained households, fiscal policy is more effective in increasing private
consumption in recessions than in expansions. Such effect squares with the fact that
usually constrained consumers contemplate short-term horizons in their consumption
and saving decisions. This issue of credit constrained households is also related to the
possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations, and the eventuality of ensuing non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal policies7.
Finally, Mulas-Granados et al. (2009) analyze the impact of fiscal policy taken
during systemic banking crises, and they show that, if countries are not funding
constrained, fiscal measures contribute to shortening the length of crisis episodes by
stimulating aggregate demand. Their results can not directly be used to compare
the impact of fiscal policies in crisis and non-crisis times. In a related study, Ro¨ger
et al. (2010) found that fiscal policy seems to play a role in the impact of banking
crises on headline growth, an insight further rationalized with simulation results. Their
econometric analysis consists of a set of OLS regressions distinguishing between crisis
and non-crisis multipliers.
7The possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations, notably when triggered by a crisis, was
initially discussed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990), although the empirical evidence is diverse (see, for
instance, Afonso (2010).
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2.3 Empirical Methodology
The focus of the present chapter is on the role of fiscal policies in phases of financial
turmoil. Such phases are associated with tighter credit constraints both for firms and
for households, leading to pronounced economic downturns.
However, frequent financial crises in single countries are very rare. Hence, if one
only looks at GDP in individual countries, there may not be enough data points to run
a time series analysis for several countries, and provide meaningful information about
the role of fiscal policies during a crisis. In order to overcome this problem we construct
an unbalanced panel containing data from the available set of OECD and non-OECD
countries.
We test the impact of government spending on economic growth during crises and
normal times by interacting the fiscal stimulus variable with a (dummy) variable that
indicates the state of the economy, ”crisis” or ”normal”. In addition, we also perform
Wald tests with the null-hypothesis that the coefficients of crisis government spending
and government spending in the absence of crisis are equal. The following linear panel
model for output growth is then specified:
Yit = β + δYit−1 + φXit + γFCit + θ1Spit · FCit + θ2Spit · (1− FCit) + uit (2.1)
In equation (2.1) the index i, (i = 1, . . . , N) denotes the country, the index
t, (t = 1, . . . , T ) indicates the period and βi stands for the individual effects to be
estimated for each country i. Yit is real output growth for country i in period t, Yit−1 is
the observation on the same series for the same country i in the previous period, Xit is
a vector of additional explanatory variables, in period t for country i. FCit(FCit−1) is a
dummy variable that captures the existence of a financial crisis (in the preceding year),
either banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis, and Spit is real government spending
growth for country i in period t. Additionally, it is assumed that the disturbances uit
are independent across countries. The interaction term Spit ·FCit denotes government
spending in the presence of a financial crisis and Spit · (1−FCit) picks up government
spending during normal times. Both interactions terms are also tested using lags.
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Obviously, the specification above is not immune to reverse causality. Current
economic growth may affect the government’s spending behavior. The influence of GDP
growth on contemporaneous spending holds true, in particular, for welfare benefits and
subsidies, notably via the functioning of automatic stabilizers. For instance, higher
economic growth reduces expenses for unemployment benefits since more people are
likely to find a job during an economic upswing. Lower growth can lead to higher
government transfers as well as to discretionary, countercyclical spending such as
infrastructure programs. This negative causal effect from growth on fiscal spending
would imply an underestimation of the fiscal stimulus’ impact. Due to the large number
of countries, data on government spending net of transfers were not available and we
need to refer to different methods to address endogeneity.
Also, real economic growth can influence government spending in a positive way
if governments follow pro-cyclically economic developments8. Under this assumption,
politicians do not save (discretionarily) in good times and do not (discretionarily)
provide fiscal stimuli in crisis times. Without accounting for endogeneity, this effect
would lead to an overestimation of the fiscal multiplier. In our sample, which includes
OECD and non-OECD countries, we find some evidence of the first assumption, that
growth contemporaneously affects spending in a negative way as fiscal multipliers are
larger when endogeneity is accounted for.
A possible way to address endogeneity would be to use time lags of the relevant
explanatory variables. Due to data availability we can only use yearly change in
spending. As shown by single country time series studies with quarterly data (for
instance, Perotti (2004)) the positive impact of a government spending shock vanishes
approximately after four to five quarters. That is, with one year lagged spending growth
as ordinary control variable, instead of current spending growth, we could address the
endogeneity problem but we cannot measure the fiscal multiplier properly. Using lagged
government spending as an instrument captures spending habits potentially linked to
the institutional path of the economy, rather than discretionary changes in spending9.
8Jaeger and Schuknecht (2004) mention that boom-bust phases tend to exacerbate already existing
pro-cyclical policy biases, toward higher spending and public debt ratios.
9Actually, using lagged spending as an instrument in a basic panel set up would imply the lack of
statistically significance for the effect of spending on growth in our dataset.
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We therefore use the following two instruments explained in detail in section 2.4.2: the
distance to elections (related to the political budget cycle, Brender and Drazen (2005);
and the lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Data
Our panel covers 127 countries out of which 98 countries experienced financial crises
during the years 1981-2007. The crisis dummy was taken from the IMF dataset on
financial crisis. The maximum number of observations used, due to data availability
across the panel, is 2867 (3271 observations were initially gathered), and the number
of crises years is 218 (encompassing banking, currency and sovereign debt crises). To
avoid the influence of outliers, we restrict the dependent variable, GDP growth, as well
as the spending variables by excluding the first and last percentile of the sample. Data
descriptions and sources are reported in the Appendix.
In our panel, government spending increases on average at 0.76 percent of GDP
per year. Spending decreases on a yearly basis by 0.05 percent of last period’s GDP
on average in the starting year of the crisis and by 0.1 percent of GDP in the next
year. Hence, during financial crises governments tend to spend less money, eventually
because revenues decline as well. Only during 90 crisis episodes we observe a positive
change in government spending relative to GDP the year after the beginning of the
crisis.
Real GDP growth is adversely affected by a financial crisis as will be confirmed in
our regression results reported in the next sections. While the average real growth rate
in our panel is 3.4%, it goes down to 0.1% during a crisis. We also collected data on
claims to the private sector. There exists some evidence that links credit contractions to
financial markets distress (see Claessens et al. (2008)), and we test the hypothesis that
increases in credit concession to the private sector can attenuate economic slowdowns.
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2.4.2 Instrumenting Spending Growth
Altogether, to address the endogeneity problem we use two instruments, the distance
to elections referring to the political budget cycle according to Brender and Drazen
(2005) and the lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio. Distance to elections is a linear
distance measure between the current year and the year of the next election. In other
words, the indicator counts the years until the next election takes place. The election
years are taken from Pippa Norris’ Democracy Time series Dataset (2009). For non-
OECD countries, we use the year of legislative elections. For OECD countries, we use
legislative elections if the country has a parliamentary system and executive elections if
the country is characterized by a presidential system10. Note that, by the nature of the
instrument, we only capture states with regular elections as reported in the dataset.
The distance-to-elections indicator takes on values from 1 to 5.
By using a distance-to-elections indicator, which runs throughout the political
budget cycle, we are benefiting from two effects: increase in spending before elections,
and decrease in spending after elections11. Also, by imposing a parameterized linear
relationship we obtain a more robust instrument than using pre-election dummies only.
Moreover, as can be seen in Table 2.1, in columns (1)-(4), when there are more than
two pre-election dummies, the explanatory power decreases strongly: four years before
elections can simultaneously be one year before other, out-of-cycle, elections. This fact,
for instance, is taken into account by the indicator.
The parameterized relation between distance to elections and spending is not
always monotonous: empirically, the year of elections (”zero distance”) does not display
the largest spending increase. Changes in government spending in the year of elections
depend very much on when elections take place. Elections in spring can trigger spending
cuts for the rest of the year while elections in autumn can lead to spending increases.
Since our data do not provide information on the month of elections, we use evidence
from regressions of spending growth on different sets of pre-election dummies and
construct three different indicators: first, we assign the value three to the election year
10Due to data accuracy we use information on the political system only for OECD countries.
11The relations between electoral cycles and government behavior be traced back to Nordhaus (1975)
and Hibbs (1977), respectively regarding opportunistic and partisan cycles.
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(Distance I)12; second, we assign a missing value to the election year (Distance II); and
third, we keep the value zero in each year in which elections take place (Distance III).
The underlying hypothesis for the indicator Distance I to use the value three is that
average spending during the election year changes more closely in line with average
spending three years before elections (which is, on average, the post-election year in
our sample) than with spending one or two years before elections.
Table 2.1 compares the three indicators’ performance in the first stage. For regular
spending we find that the closer elections (the smaller the indicator) the larger the
spending increase, as predicted by the political budget cycle hypothesis. The correlation
is significant for Distance I and Distance II. For crisis spending, however, we find that
the closer elections the less governments tend to spend. Put differently, governments
during financial crises react more strongly via spending when they have more time to
stay in office13. This correlation is less robust and only Distance I is significant. Note
that there are fewer observations for Distance II which is likely to have an impact
on crisis spending given the limited number of crisis observations. In the subsequent
analysis we use the indicator Distance I as instrument for government spending.
As a second instrument we use the one year lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio,
the difference between total revenue and total expenditure of the central government
relative to GDP. The underlying hypothesis is that the larger the buffer provided
by last year’s budget balance position relative to last year’s GDP, the higher is
government spending growth during normal times. To avoid that the instrument lagged
budget balance-to-GDP ratio is capturing good governance and disciplined political
institutions, which is in turn correlated with GDP growth, the budget balance-to-GDP
ratio is lagged twice and included in the regression. Furthermore, to ensure that lagged
budget balance to GDP is exogenous, we control for lagged spending growth and lagged
revenue growth. The Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions (not reported)
strongly supports the validity of the above described instruments.
These two instruments capture different aspects of government spending. Distance
12Let the election year be denoted by t. In t, the indicator assumes the value 3. In t-1, t-2, and t-3,
the indicator assumes 1, 2, and 3 respectively. For a country with a 4-year cycle over a period of, for
instance, 8 years the distance indicator starting with an election year is accordingly: 3-3-2-1-3-3-2-1.
13Exogeneity tests rejected the hypothesis that a fall in GDP leads to new elections, hence we reject
the hypothesis that the instrument is correlated with the dependent variable.
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to elections is a good measure for discretionary fiscal activities if politicians act
according to the ”political budget cycle”. The budget balance ratio considers the
financial leeway provided by last year’s government budget to predict current spending.
We perform the instrumental variable estimations with one and two instruments
interacted with the crisis dummy. For each specification we report the results of the
Kleibergen-Paap test of under identification and the Angrist-Pischke test of weak
identification for each individual regressor reflecting the validity of our instruments.
2.4.3 Results and Discussion
Table 2.2 reports the panel estimation results using real GDP growth as the dependent
variable as in specification (2.1), using only the distance to elections as an instrument
for real government spending growth, and controlling for the existence of a financial
crisis, in which case the dummy variable FC assumes the value of one (zero otherwise).
We perform each specification with a 1-year definition of financial crisis −FC equals
one in the starting year of the crisis - and a 2-year definition of financial crisis (reported
in Table2.9) - where FC2 equals one in the crisis’ starting year as well as in the following
year.
Fiscal Multipliers and Instrument Performance From Table 2.2 we can see
that increases in real government spending growth have a positive impact on real
GDP growth. In addition, the estimated government spending coefficients are higher
when a crisis occurs. However, as shown by the Wald test, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients for government spending are equal with and
without a financial crisis. The existence of a financial crisis also decreases real growth
unequivocally. In addition, we also used the variables inflation and claims to the private
sector, which indeed had a negative and positive estimated coefficient respectively.
Higher inflation reduces economic growth and increases in credit concession to the
private sector can positively impinge on economic growth. Limited data availability
on claims to the private sector significantly reduces observations and we only report
this variable in our 2-year specifications, see Table2.9. In almost all specifications, the
positive impact of spending on GDP remains significant.
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Table 2.2: Spending Instrumented by Distance to Elections, 1y Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP GDP GDP GDP
Spending*(1-FC) 0.251* 0.195* 0.193 0.260
(1.87) (1.74) (1.51) (1.46)
Spending*FC 0.502* 0.518* 0.461* 0.697*
(1.72) (1.86) (1.75) (1.82)
GDP(-1) 0.237** 0.257*** 0.230** 0.138
(2.15) (3.00) (2.49) (1.15)
FC -0.0875*** -0.0855*** -0.0892*** -0.0760**
(-3.74) (-3.62) (-4.01) (-2.55)
L.FC -0,00141 -0,00125 -0,000732 -0,00409
(-0.27) (-0.24) (-0.15) (-0.70)
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1)) 0,00535 0,00808 0,0185
(0.32) (0.45) (0.94)
Spending(-1)*FC(-1) 0,0659 0,0643 0,0941
(1.58) (1.56) (1.37)
Revenue(-1) 0,0139 0,0129 0,00376
(0.60) (0.53) (0.13)
Inflation -0.00316***
(-3.63)
Time Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Observations 2574 2487 2487 2250
No. Clusters 119 119 119 111
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 7,06 8,7 6,85 4,42
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0,0079 0,0032 0,0089 0,0356
Angrist-Pischke F Statistic Spending*(1-FC) 7,2144 8,9486 6,739 4,2195
Angrist-Pischke F Statistic Spending*FC 1,8981 2,1231 2,1559 1,6997
Wald Test Statistic 0,5819 1,1622 0,804 0,9796
Wald Test p-value 0,4456 0,281 0,3699 0,3223
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01, t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel with
country fixed effects. GDP, Spending, and Revenue in growth rates. FC - dummy variable for
the existence of a financial crisis. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis spending
and regular spending are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is
that the coefficients of the interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal.
The Kleibergen-Paap statistic tests the null that the equation is underidentified. The Angrist-
Pischke F statistic tests weak identification of each individual endogenous variable. Constant
as well as fixed effects interactions with crises dummy are partialled out.
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In this specification government spending coefficients can not directly be
interpreted as fiscal multipliers. We have to multiply them by the inverse average
share of government spending in GDP14. In our data sample, government spending
amounts to around 36% of GDP for the full sample, 33% of GDP for non-OECD
countries and 46% of GDP for OECD countries. Overall, the magnitude of the above
fiscal multipliers (about 0.6-1.1 for regular and crisis spending) is broadly in line with
multipliers observed in the existing literature assuming an average government spending
share of GDP of about one third15. Similar results can be observed when government
spending is instrumented with both the distance to elections and the lagged budget
balance (see Table 2.3). In this case, the fiscal multiplier is around 0.6-0.7.
Reverse causality seems to be stronger in crisis times. Intuitively, this is appealing,
implying that social transfers and discretionary spending react stronger during an
expected and/or experienced economic downturn than in times of an economic upswing.
Overall, albeit the qualitative differences, endogeneity does not influence our findings
since the marginal impact of spending is not statistically different in crisis and non-crisis
times.
Moreover, government spending in the presence of a financial crisis, when
compared to normal times, is clearly larger in Table 2.2 compared to Table 2.3. This
is likely to be due to a weak instrument bias for crisis spending when using only the
distance to elections indicator (see the results for the Angrist-Pischke test). Including
the lagged budget balance ratio, the coefficients of crisis spending and regular spending
are approximately equal.
In Tables 2.2 and 2.3 we can reject the null hypothesis that the equation is
underidentified. In Table 2.3, including the lagged budget ratio balance improves the
instrument performance in the first stage for crisis and regular spending. Indeed, the
Kleibergen-Paap test statistic also passes the critical value of 10 allowing rejecting
the null of under-identification. The Angrist-Pischke F statistic which tests individual
endogenous variables separately passes the value 10 for regular spending when using
14With Y - GDP, G - government spending, m - fiscal multiplier, Yt−Yt−1Yt−1 = m
Gt−Gt−1
Gt−1
↔ ∆Yt =
m ·∆Gt Yt−1Gt−1 and ∆Y∆G ∼= m · YG
15Our estimates based on different instruments yield output multipliers that are close to the ones
derived, for instance, in the papers by Baxter and King (1993), Linnemann and Schabert (2003).
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Table 2.3: Spending Instrumented by Distance to Elections and Lagged Budget
Balance, 1y Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
Spending*(1-FC) 0.133*** 0.146*** 0.270*** 0.252** 0.235*
(3.47) (3.04) (2.58) (2.41) (1.80)
Spending*FC 0.106* 0.129** 0.245** 0.258** 0.206*
(1.92) (2.01) (2.30) (2.42) (1.69)
GDP(-1) 0.320*** 0.310*** 0.233*** 0.213*** 0.186**
(6.80) (5.66) (3.12) (2.84) (2.06)
FC -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.102*** -0.101*** -0.0985***
(-27.05) (-21.88) (-19.35) (-17.14) (-13.36)
FC(-1) -0,00538 -0.00793** -0,00481 -0,0047 -0.00946**
(-1.26) (-1.98) (-1.04) (-1.05) (-2.06)
GDP(-2) 0,0117 0,0173 0,0165 0,0108
(0.33) (0.50) (0.49) (0.31)
Budget Balance Ratio(-2) -0,0209 -0,0975 -0,0926 -0.120
(-0.89) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.43)
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1)) 0,0361 0,0352 0,042
(1.35) (1.36) (1.41)
Spending(-1)*FC(-1) 0,0338 0,0332 0,032
(0.71) (0.73) (0.56)
Revenue(-1) -0,0149 -0,0127 -0,00976
(-0.65) (-0.55) (-0.37)
Inflation -0.00229***
(-5.61)
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 2574 2475 2412 2412 2179
No. Clusters 119 119 119 119 111
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 37,58 27,72 14,74 15,29 10,71
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0 0 0,0021 0,0016 0,0134
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*(1-FC) 22,8453 14,0461 9,6331 11,1354 5,0068
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*FC 5,6381 4,8398 5,4338 5,9152 3,4382
Wald Test Statistic 0,193 0,0687 0,1149 0,0045 0,0521
Wald Test p-value 0,6604 0,7932 0,7347 0,9464 0,8194
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01, t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel with country
fixed effects. GDP, Spending, and Revenue in growth rates. FC - dummy variable for the existence
of financial crisis. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis spending and regular spending
are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients of the
interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic
tests the null that the equation is underidentified. The Angrist-Pischke F statistic tests weak
identification of each individual endogenous variable. Constant as well as fixed effects interactions
with crises dummy are partialled out. Equation (4) is over-identified.
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both instruments suggesting that distance to elections and lagged budget balance
ratio are good predictors for regular spending. For crisis spending the Angrist-Pischke
statistic assumes values from 3 to 8 in 1-year and 2-year specifications (see Table 2.9)
with both instruments and the full sample. This leaves us with a potential bias of our
OLS estimates towards an overestimation of the impact of spending during crisis times.
Differentiated Fixed Effects Our sample comprises observations from a diverse
set of countries and thus collects information from very heterogeneous financial crises.
To allow for a different severity of crisis across countries and a reaction of economic
variables to the occurrence of financial crisis (possibly due, for instance, to institutional
differences) we interact country dummies with crisis dummies in each specification.
The above results from the IV regression with ”differentiated fixed effects”
are similar to the results obtained with a sample split into crises and non-crises
observations16. By keeping the full sample and introducing a country specific interaction
term with crises we benefit from gains in efficiency and instrument validity. Moreover,
we can directly test the hypothesis of equality between spending in crises and non-crises
times17.
A direct consequence of this approach is that - as in the case of fixed effects
observations for countries with only one crisis-year (singleton dummies) are not
included in the analysis. Since many countries indeed experienced several financial
crises, our FC dummy variable captures 111 crises years for 45 countries with two to
four crises. The coefficient of the FC dummy in the tables has to be interpreted by
taking into account that country specific crises reactions of GDP have already been
partialled out. As a robustness check, we run every specification with a 2-year definition
of crises, which also includes observations with only one crisis per country (see Tables
2.8-2.12).
16Tables are not reported and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
17The coefficients of these interaction terms are not reported since they are partialled out in the
regressions, together with the constant.
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2.4.4 Robustness Analysis
OECD and Non-OECD Economies Evidence from the related literature points
out that (economic) cyclical fiscal behavior in developed economies is somewhat
different from the case of developing economies. The conventional wisdom that emerges
from such studies is that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical or a-cyclical in most developed
countries, while it is pro-cyclical in developing countries18. Specifically, reverse causality
could be different in developed and developing economies. It is therefore important to
analyze the instrument’s performance and instrumented fiscal multipliers in OECD and
non-OECD sub-samples.
As Table 2.4 shows, the results for non-OECD countries are close to the results
obtained for the full sample and fiscal multipliers, for both crisis and regular spending,
are on average 0.6. In addition, the instruments behave similarly in the first stage
and statistical significance is also comparable to the full sample regressions. For OECD
countries, however, distance to elections, i.e. the political budget cycle, does not perform
very well as an instrument during regular times (see Table 2.5) while performance is
very good during crisis times.
The literature on the political budget cycle mostly confirms our results of different
fiscal attitudes in OECD and non-OECD countries (see, for instance, Shi and Svensson
(2006)). Interestingly, distance to elections matters for crisis spending as we find a
significant negative correlation in the first stage. In other words, during financial crisis,
fiscal action is required by the electorate in OECD countries. The lagged budget
balance-to-GDP ratio is also significant during crises with a larger coefficient than
in the non-OECD countries regressions, while it is not significant in regular times.
Overall, it proved to be difficult to build a significant instrument for regular
spending in OECD countries. Therefore, in Table 2.5 (and Table 2.11) the under
identification test is not passed. The reported value, however, only captures the average
validity of instruments over both endogenous variables. The instruments for crisis
spending, crisis distance to elections and crisis lagged budget balance, are still highly
significant in the first stage as shown by the Angrist-Pischke test statistic. The fiscal
18See, for instance, Gal´ı (1994), Lane (2003), Kaminsky et al. (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), and
Alesina et al. (2008).
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Table 2.4: Spending Instrumented by Distance to Elections and Lagged Budget
Balance, Non-OECD Countries, 1y Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
Spending*(1-FC) 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.245*** 0.216** 0.208*
(3.65) (3.16) (2.63) (2.43) (1.88)
Spending*FC 0.117** 0.138** 0.245** 0.222* 0.170
(2.11) (2.05) (2.17) (1.82) (1.27)
GDP(-1) 0.305*** 0.297*** 0.231*** 0.212*** 0.175**
(5.87) (5.06) (3.10) (2.98) (2.10)
FC -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.101*** -0.106*** -0.103***
(-24.15) (-19.72) (-18.79) (-5.57) (-5.10)
FC(-1) -0,00404 -0,00712 -0,00371 -0,0035 -0,00846
(-0.84) (-1.58) (-0.74) (-0.72) (-1.56)
GDP(-2) 0,0239 0,0312 0,0213 0,0184
(0.62) (0.83) (0.59) (0.49)
Budget Balance Ratio(-2) -0,0191 -0,0887 -0,0704 -0.118
(-0.60) (-1.13) (-0.99) (-1.17)
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1)) 0,0339 0,0255 0,0392
(1.23) (0.99) (1.26)
Spending(-1)*FC(-1) 0,0366 0,0447 0,0412
(0.77) (0.91) (0.62)
Revenue(-1) -0,0113 -0,000365 -0,00404
(-0.50) (-0.02) (-0.16)
Inflation -0.00228***
(-5.03)
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 1869 1794 1732 1732 1518
No. Clusters 91 91 91 91 84
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 35,06 28,36 16,92 18,38 13,82
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0 0 0,0007 0,0004 0,0032
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*(1-FC) 17,6861 13,325 9,8659 11,7816 10,0344
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*FC 4,8236 4,1282 4,6397 4,5149 3,6008
Wald Test Statistic 0,2034 0,0224 0 0,0051 0,0923
Wald Test p-value 0,652 0,8811 0,9993 0,9429 0,7613
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01, t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel with country
fixed effects. GDP, Spending, and Revenue in growth rates. FC - dummy variable for the existence
of financial crisis. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis spending and regular spending
are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients of the
interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic
tests the null that the equation is underidentified. The Angrist-Pischke F statistic tests weak
identification of each individual endogenous variable. Constant as well as fixed effects interactions
with crises dummy are partialled out.
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Table 2.5: Spending Instrumented by Distance to Elections and Lagged Budget
Balance, OECD Countries, 1y Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP
Spending*(1-FC) 0,0072 0.486 0.473 0.909 0,0285
(0.06) (0.65) (0.72) (0.73) (0.05)
Spending*FC 0.247 0.383*** 0.386*** 0.354** 0.296**
(1.07) (3.33) (3.39) (1.98) (2.03)
GDP(-1) 0.450*** 0.272 0.266 0,0303 0.433*
(8.74) (0.80) (0.85) (0.05) (1.77)
FC (dropped) (dropped) 0.0469*** (dropped) (dropped)
(4.02)
FC(-1) -0,00667 -0,0213 -0,0196 -0,0394 -0,00453
(-1.00) (-0.80) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-0.15)
GDP(-2) -0.119* -0.123** -0,0775 -0.0800*
(-1.69) (-2.19) (-0.93) (-1.79)
Budget Balance Ratio(-2) -0,0787 -0.110 -0.202 0,00398
(-0.62) (-0.80) (-0.69) (0.03)
Spending(-1)*(1-FC(-1)) -0,0112 0,0252 0,0262
(-0.36) (0.41) (0.97)
Spending(-1)*FC(-1) -0,0557 0.189 -0.130
(-0.23) (0.30) (-0.34)
Revenue(-1) 0,0306 -0,0442 0,000398
(0.70) (-0.40) (0.01)
Inflation -0,0206
(-0.90)
Time Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes
Observations 705 681 680 680 661
No. Clusters 28 28 28 28 27
Kleibergen-Paap LM Statistic 8,06 2,23 0,95 0,87 1,04
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0,0447 0,5256 0,8145 0,8323 0,791
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*(1-FC) 9,828 3,5666 0,2691 0,1536 0,3232
Angrist-Pischke F Stat Spending*FC 3,2168 10,5399 13,1838 10,9541 18,3869
Wald Test Statistic 0,7764 0,0165 0,0192 0,2208 0,3222
Wald Test p-value 0,3782 0,8977 0,8898 0,6384 0,5703
Notes: *p < 0.10,**p < 0.05,***p < 0.01, t-statistics in brackets. Unbalanced panel with country
fixed effects. GDP, Spending, and Revenue in growth rates. FC - dummy variable for the existence
of financial crisis. A Wald test is conducted to test whether crisis spending and regular spending
are statistically different. The underlying null hypothesis of the test is that the coefficients of the
interaction terms between spending and financial crisis are equal. The Kleibergen-Paap statistic
tests the null that the equation is underidentified. The Angrist-Pischke F statistic tests weak
identification of each individual endogenous variable. Constant as well as fixed effects interactions
with crises dummy are partialled out.
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multiplier of crisis spending ranges between 0.7 and 0.8 and is therefore slightly larger
than in non-OECD countries (the underlying fiscal share is 46% of GDP, as described
above).
Banking Crisis The previous analysis showed the impact of government spending
on economic growth during up to 141 financial crises, which included banking crises,
currency crises, and debt crises. Table 2.6 reports on to what extent government
spending and growth are correlated during the identified 60 banking crises.
Given the limited number of banking crises recorded in the IMF dataset on
financial crisis, between 1981 and 2007 and, in particular, the high proportion of only
one banking crises per country, we can only use the 2-year definition of crises, which
provides us with two observations per crisis and thus allows us to use the singleton
crises. Again, country dummies are interacted with banking crisis dummy in Table
2.6, hence the coefficient of BC2 has to be interpreted taking into account the country
specific crises reactions.
Essentially, in the IV estimation spending significantly differs in crises and non-
crises times. While there is no impact of a change in spending in the first and second
year of a banking crises on GDP growth, the impact of spending in normal times is
still positive (and mostly significant) with a multiplier of about 0.5.
Performing the analysis with all remaining financial crises, hence debt and
currency crises, supports these results (see Table 2.12), and the coefficient of crisis
spending is larger as for the full set of financial crises. The difference between spending
in crisis times and normal times is not significant.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have studied the impact of government spending on output notably
during the occurrence of financial crises, covering 127 countries for the period 1981-
2007. We have performed each estimation using a 1-year and a 2-year definition of
financial crisis, with and without time fixed effects.
To address the endogeneity issue we have used two instruments: the distance
to elections - a linear distance measure between the current year and the year of
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the next election - and the lagged budget balance-to-GDP ratio. According to the
results, the fiscal multiplier for instrumented regular spending ranges between 0.6 and
0.7, considering the average government spending share of GDP of about one third.
The multipliers of instrumented government spending are higher than the simple OLS
multipliers.The differences between the coefficients of government spending in crises
and non-crises periods are insignificant in most of our estimations.
More specifically, the fiscal multiplier for the full sample and for the non-OECD
sub-sample, for instrumented regular and crisis government spending, is about 0.6, with
an average government spending-to-GDP ratio of one third. For the OECD sub-sample,
government spending in the presence of a financial crisis produces a fiscal multiplier of
around 0.8 assuming an average fiscal share of GDP of around 46 percent. Moreover,
for the sub-sets of OECD and non-OECD countries our results show, that altogether,
we also cannot reject the hypothesis that government spending either in the presence
or in the absence of a financial crisis has the same impact. Interestingly, for the cases
when a banking crisis occurred, our results do not support the idea that expansionary
fiscal policies positively impact on economic growth.
Therefore, the main result of our panel analysis is that that government spending
has essentially the same impact on economic growth with or without a financial crisis.
This result holds throughout our sample, using a variation of controls, sub-samples and
specifications. Consequently, taking into account that larger spending programs tend
to be less targeted, this indicates that they may actually not be particularly helpful.
The present analysis is a first step and these conclusions are tentative. Additional
research is needed to further study the relevance of fiscal policies in the context of
financial crisis. One way forward would be to use more detailed data on the composition
of government spending and to distinguish between budgetary components that react
to changes in output and others that don’t.
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2.A Appendix Data
Year of banking, currency or sovereign debt crisis: Source:
IMF database on financial crises, Laeven and Valencia (2008), and at
http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm
Government spending: General government spending deflated with the GDP
deflator. For some countries only central government data are available. Source: IMF
World Economic Outlook database.
Budget balance: General government budget balance as percent of GDP. For some
countries only central government data are available. Source: IMF World Economic
Outlook database.
Government debt: Government gross debt as percent of GDP. For some countries
only central government data are available. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
database.
Real GDP: Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database.
GDP gap: Difference between actual and trend real GDP, as a percentage of trend
real GDP. Trend GDP is estimated using an HP-filter on real GDP. The lambda value
is chosen as 100.
Inflation rate: Consumer price index. Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database
Long-term nominal interest rate: Data are only available for OECD countries.
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.
Election dates: Legal and Executive Elections taken from Pippa Norris. 2009. Democ-
racy Time Series Dataset. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm
Claims on private sector: Source: IMF IFS Database.
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Table 2.7: List of countries
All countries OECD sub-sample
Albania Ghana Oman Australia
Algeria Greece Pakistan Austria
Antigua and Barbuda Guinea Panama Belgium
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Paraguay Canada
Australia Guyana Peru Czech Republic
Austria Hungary Philippines Denmark
Azerbaijan Iceland Poland Finland
Bahamas, The India Portugal France
Bangladesh Indonesia Romania Germany
Barbados Iran Russia Greece
Belgium Ireland Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe Hungary
Belize Israel Saudi Arabia Iceland
Bolivia Italy Senegal Ireland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Jamaica Seychelles Italy
Brazil Japan Singapore Japan
Bulgaria Jordan Slovak Republic Korea
Burkina Faso Kazakhstan Slovenia Luxembourg
Burundi Kenya South Africa Mexico
Cambodia Korea Spain Netherlands
Canada Kuwait Sri Lanka New Zealand
Cape Verde Kyrgyz Republic Swaziland Norway
Chile Lao Sweden Poland
China Latvia Switzerland Portugal
Colombia Lebanon Syrian Arab Republic Slovak Republic
Costa Rica Lithuania Taiwan Spain
Coˆte d’Ivoire Luxembourg Tajikistan Sweden
Croatia Madagascar Thailand Switzerland
Cyprus Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago United Kingdom
Czech Republic Mauritania Turkmenistan United States
Denmark Mauritius Uganda
Djibouti Mexico Ukraine
Dominican Republic Moldova United Arab Emirates
Ecuador Mongolia United Kingdom
Egypt Morocco United States
El Salvador Mozambique Uruguay
Equatorial Guinea Namibia Uzbekistan
Estonia Nepal Venezuela
Ethiopia Netherlands Vietnam
Fiji New Zealand Yemen
Finland Nicaragua Zambia
France Niger Zimbabwe
Georgia Nigeria
Germany Norway
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Chapter 3
Incentive or Control? Taxing
Returns to Capital
3.1 Introduction
I expect to see the State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of
capital goods on long views and on the basis of the general social advantage, taking an
ever greater responsibility for directly organising investment.
Keynes (1936) 1
In this chapter we turn to the revenue side of a government’s budget and consider
different ways to raise funds. The chapter is indeed a contribution to an old debate
on the role of the state: we analyze the decision of governments to interfere into the
control rights of firms. The study offers an explanation of why and when governments
interfere into a firm’s investment choice which builds purely on economic reasoning by
combining a governmental revenue motive with informational frictions.
Government control of firms has historically proven to be an inefficient concept of
resource allocation as such. In particular after 1989 there has been a broad consensus on
the role of the state, that is, to guarantee free markets. Policy changes in Latin America,
successful government owned enterprises in Asia, and a wave of nationalizations
following the turmoil in European and US American markets in the 2008 financial crisis
have revived this ancient debate on government intervention. As of 2009, the value of
1The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, Book IV, pg.164
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state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across the OECD is estimated at USD 2 trillion and
SOEs employ more than 6 million people according to the OECD (2011a).
From an empirical perspective, there is a wide heterogeneity in the scope of the
state sector across countries and over time2. Political influence and ideology, resource
endowments and natural monopolies are important aspects which contribute to explain
why and under which conditions governments interfere into investment decisions.
In this chapter, we explore a motive based on purely economic forces: government
revenue collection combined with informational frictions on capital inputs. Hence, in the
following, we look at the generation of public revenue from entrepreneurial returns. In
an economy with private information on capital investments and a revenue requirement
for a state authority we compare two forms of governmental revenue collection: output
taxation designed with appropriate incentives to invest the socially optimal level of
capital on the one hand, and, on the other hand, control of capital inputs and collection
of dividends. The latter can also be interpreted as a form of property taxation and state
ownership of firms.
The study builds on a simple trade-off: if entrepreneurial output is taxed in a
progressive way, the entrepreneur has an incentive to reduce her investments. Given
a positive revenue requirement, there are two ways to tackle this problem: setting
the right incentives or controlling inputs. We show that the optimal choice for the
government between control or incentive provision depends on three parameters: the
government’s revenue requirement, the entrepreneurs’ preferences for insurance and the
monitoring costs of capital.
With intermediate monitoring costs, we can derive the following results. Incentive
based taxation is optimal under two parameter combinations: (i) if entrepreneurs have
strong preferences for insurance and the revenue requirement is relatively large; and
(ii) if entrepreneurs’ demand for insurance is low and the revenue requirement is
relatively small. In turn, interpreting an entrepreneur’s preference for insurance of
ex post income as a preference for social security and redistribution we can argue
that revenue generation via capital control is optimal under more ‘unconventional’
parameter combinations: (i) if governments face a low revenue requirement although
2See, for instance, OECD (2005) and OECD (2011b)
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entrepreneurs have a strong insurance and redistributive motive, and (ii) if a high
revenue requirement must be raised from a population with low preferences for
redistribution.
The model builds on the literature of optimal capital taxation, cf. Golosov et al.
(2003) and Albanesi (2006), and includes risk averse entrepreneurs facing uncertain
returns to capital. We relax one crucial assumption: the observability of capital input.
Hence, while effort has been the unobserved investment choice of an entrepreneur
in Albanesi (2006), for instance, it is capital in our model. We further augment the
standard environment by a binary choice of the government whether to monitor and
control capital or not. This gives rise to two mechanisms of revenue collection: (i) if
capital is not controlled, an incentive compatible tax schedule is designed such that
entrepreneurs invest the socially optimal amount of capital; (ii) if the government
chooses to monitor capital, the tax schedule conditions on capital inputs and controls
the investment decision directly.
Under both systems, revenue collection is costly, but cost structures differ. Under
capital control the government pays monitoring costs. The larger the monitoring costs,
the higher the entrepreneurs’ welfare loss from an increase in government revenue.
Under incentive based taxation, the government faces the classical equity-efficiency
trade-off and pays incentive costs. These costs increase in government revenue if the
economy’s ratio of prudence to risk aversion is sufficiently high and decrease if the ratio
is sufficiently low implying a high demand for insurance.
Under capital control, an increase in revenue requirement triggers a purely
negative income effect which size depends on monitoring costs. Under incentive based
taxation, an increase in revenue requirement has an income and substitution effect:
income decreases due to transfers to the government; at the same time, lower net
income for the entrepreneur makes it possible to substitute incentive provision with
insurance against uncertainty in entrepreneurial output. If the increase in insurance is
sufficiently strong, incentive costs will be lower than monitoring costs and it is optimal
for the government to choose capital control instead of incentive taxation to raise public
revenue.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold with both, a theoretical and an
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applied perspective. The optimal taxation literature is based on relatively restrictive
informational assumptions. Starting with the seminal paper by Mirrlees (1971)3, this
type of literature develops constrained efficient allocations via tax schedules that
condition on variables such as labor and capital input. Information acquisition of these
variables is indeed costly for any government. This study relaxes these assumptions
and takes monitoring costs into account. Moreover, we conduct a comparative statics
analysis of incentive costs and revenue which has not yet been done analytically for
optimal capital taxation.
A related paper which also combines incentives and risk preferences albeit in
a different context is Newman (2007)4. He considers the role of risk aversion in the
context of occupational choice and shows that under decreasing risk aversion but with
private insurance markets wealthier agents become workers and poorer agents become
entrepreneurs. He uses an incentive effect which is similar to the one described in this
chapter: wealthier agents need to bear more risk to act in an incentive compatible
way. The author only considers the class of utility functions with decreasing absolute
risk aversion while this chapter compares the welfare of entrepreneurs in different
preference situations hereby stressing the role of prudence versus risk aversion. We
further emphasize the role of the government revenue requirement and the choice
between taxation and capital control, the alternative revenue generation mechanism.
On the applied perspective, several policy implications can be derived from
the theoretical results. First, an incentive based system achieves higher welfare the
stronger the demand for insurance and redistribution, in particular at large revenues.
Second, at given monitoring costs, capital control dominates incentive based taxation
under empirically unconventional parameter combinations which are likely to happen
if the economy is hit by a revenue shock, such as wars or the discovery of natural
resources. Third, for sectors or economies with high monitoring costs, incentive based
taxation yields a higher welfare than capital control independent of revenue requirement
and preference regime. And fourth, the wealthier an economy, the less government
interference is optimal and the higher the welfare from incentive based taxation.
3See Kocherlakota (2005) for a survey of the more recent literature.
4I thank Nicola Pavoni for pointing this out to me.
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The chapter proceeds as follows: in Section 3.2, the model environment is
described. Section 3.3 characterizes capital control, and Section 3.4 explores incentive
based taxation. Section 3.5 characterizes the optimal choice between the two revenue
collection mechanisms and section 3.6 provides an analysis of the results. Policy
implications and concluding remarks are presented in the final section. All proofs can
be found in the appendix.
3.2 Model Environment
A welfare maximizing government faces a continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs
who live for two periods. Entrepreneurs invest capital in their company in the first
period and earn stochastic returns on investments in the second period. Their lifetime
utility depends on consumption in Period 1 and 2 and is given by
U(k, c, c) = u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c)). (3.1)
We make the following assumptions on utility: discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), u′(.) >
0, u′′(.) < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞, limc→∞ u′(c) = 0. c denotes second period consumption
in the high state and c denotes second period consumption in the low state.
First period consumption, ω− k, is the difference between wealth endowment, ω,
and capital investment, k. Assume for the moment that the distribution of initial wealth
is degenerate at ω. We will relax this assumption in Paragraph 3.6.1. Entrepreneurs
can choose whether to invest a small or large amount of their wealth, k ∈ {k, k}, with
0 < k < k ≤ ω. Higher investments lead to lower consumption in the first period
but higher expected return in the second period. Empirically, this assumption can be
interpreted as entrepreneurs choosing between two projects with different financing
conditions and average returns while the output in monetary terms does not inform
about the types of projects.
Denote y the random gross return on capital which is produced with the following
technology:
y =
 y with probability piky with probability 1− pik
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with y > y and pik > pik. Hence the expected return Ek[y] is increasing in
capital. We assume that it is optimal to invest k and the economy’s efficiency condition
u′(w−k)
βu′(Ek[y]−G)
≤ pi′
k
(y − y) is satisfied for all levels of government revenue G.
The government has to meet the external revenue requirement G and collects
its funds from entrepreneurial income in the second period. G can be interpreted as
military expenses, public sector costs, or transfers to those who do not own capital. We
consider a government deciding on net income or consumption levels c, c directly instead
of choosing tax schedule T (·, ·),5 where c = y − T (·, ·) 6. This approach is described,
for instance, in the taxation principle (see Guesnerie (1998)), which implies that the
set of allocations obtained by maximizing subject to an anonymous tax schedule is
equivalent to the set of allocations obtained from centralized optimization with respect
to consumption levels taking into account incentive feasibility.
Initial endowment ω is public information, as well as output levels and
the distribution over outputs. Capital input levels are private information of the
entrepreneurs and can be observed by government institutions at costs δ > 0. One
can claim that observing output levels is as costly as observing input levels. The focus
of this chapter is to compare input control with private information on input and w.o.l.g
we normalize monitoring costs of y to zero. There is no bond market and entrepreneurs
cannot save.
We use a simple moral hazard environment (cf. Albanesi (2006) for capital
taxation) with one significant modification to standard models: the underlying source
of private information does not refer to effort input but capital input. The ultimate
consequence of this change is that capital can be consumed if not invested which
is not the case for effort. Hence, with non-linear utility effort costs are additively
separable while capital costs are not. Moreover, this allows us to further examine wealth
5Note that T (·, ·) can be conditioned on input, output or both. In this chapter, we focus on
comparing T (y, kˆ) with T (y, k), that is a tax schedule with unobserved investment to controlled
capital investment.
6Conditioning on y could be interpreted as output taxation, which is empirically contestable since
most capital taxes are deducted from net returns to capital investments. Reducing y by the amount
of invested capital gives us net returns, which can be introduced into the model by means of a
stronger condition on consumption levels c, c ≥ k. This condition has an impact on the maximum
revenue requirement but does not change the results qualitatively. For simplicity, we condition on
consumption levels larger than zero.
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effects and investment/savings decisions. Most importantly, by imposing informational
frictions on capital we can interpret information acquisition in a broader context and
thus provide an answer to our initial research question about government interference
in private firms: if capital input is observed, the government is able to condition on
its level and thus to control investments. This can be interpreted as interfering into a
firm’s control rights and, ultimately, as owning the firm’s equity.
As δ is a cost borne by the government it enters the government budget directly
and can capture various forms of distortions arising from government control next
to the above mentioned monitoring costs. First, δ can reflect lower expected output
or an exogenous efficiency loss from public management if the firm is controlled by
the government: Ek[y |priv] > Ek[y |gov]. Here, the agents’ wealth ω is taxed in
the first period and used for investments in SOEs. Second, δ represents additional
financing needs to keep SOEs running and these costs simply add up to the external
requirement G. The costs can be higher wages in SOEs or perks and bribes to
government officials-entrepreneurs. And third, for an endogenous determination of
δ, this distortion can be interpreted as the consequence of a soft budget constraint
arising from commitment problems. Then, property tax τt raised to finance (controlled)
investment kt is (partially) channeled to fill gaps in the current budget and to finance
Gt. This happens, for instance, when governments maximize welfare of the current
generation (with a share of agents in the investment period, α, and the other share of
agents in the return period, (1−α): αu(w− k) + (1−α)βEk[u(c)]) thereby neglecting
future generations or if the government has a high discount rate while maximizing the
welfare of several generations. With lower investments in period t, expected output
in t+1, Ek[yt+1], is smaller and property taxation in period t+1 has to help meeting
revenue requirement Gt+1.
3.3 Capital Control
We first characterize the allocation of consumption and capital investment, {k∗, c∗, c∗},
under a capital control mechanism. The government invests in a monitoring device
which allows for perfectly observing inputs at costs δ and maximizes the following
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W c(G, 0)
W c(G, δ′)
W c(G, δ′′)
G
W c(G, δ)
Gmax(δ′′) Gmax(δ′) Gmax(0)
u(c∗0)
Figure 3.1: Pareto Frontiers with Different Values of δ: 0 < δ′ < δ′′
problem subject to its budget constraint:
max
c,c≥0
u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c))
subject to
BC : piky + (1− pik)y ≥ pikc+ (1− pik)c+G+ δ (3.2)
The first order necessary conditions for k = k yield u′(c) = u′(c) and it follows
that c = c = c∗. The entrepreneurs’ consumption is perfectly smoothed across states
and the consumption level is determined by both revenue requirement and monitoring
costs:
BC∗δ : c
∗(G, δ) = piky + (1− pik)y −G− δ (3.3)
As a consequence, agents are fully insured against entrepreneurial risks but face lower
second period consumption due to monitoring costs.
Welfare and Comparative Statics. The Pareto frontier of the above program
given exogenous G and δ is defined as
WC(G, δ) = u(ω − k) + βu(c∗(G, δ)) ∀G. (3.4)
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Denote WCG (.) the derivative of the welfare function with respect to G. Using Equation
(3.2), under capital control, welfare decreases with government revenue G
WCG (G, δ) = −βu′(c∗(G, δ)) < 0 ∀G, (3.5)
and the welfare loss is higher the larger δ.
WCGδ(G, δ) = βu
′′(c∗(G, δ)) < 0 ∀G (3.6)
As we can see in Figure 3.3, an increase in δ shifts the Pareto frontier over G to the
left.
3.4 Incentive Based Taxation
Under the incentive based taxation scheme, the government chooses not to monitor
capital input and to design the tax schedule dependent on output only: c = y−T (y, kˆ).
Entrepreneurs facing a positive average tax rate on high output levels in the second
period have an incentive to reduce their capital input in the first period. Therefore, the
tax schedule has to be designed such that entrepreneurs choose the socially optimal
level of capital investment, k.
The government faces a trade-off between insurance and efficiency: the
government wants to smooth consumption and insure entrepreneurs against output
risk to increase aggregate welfare. But if an entrepreneur is insured and receives the
same net income in the good and bad state, expected second period consumption is
equal for low and high capital investments. The entrepreneur will reduce investment and
increase consumption in the first period since there is no additional gain from higher
inputs. The government therefore maximizes the following program including both,
resource constraint and incentive compatibility, and chooses allocations {k∗, c∗, c∗}:
max
c,c≥0
u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c))
46
subject to
BC : piky + (1− pik)y ≥ pikc+ (1− pik)c+G (3.7)
IC : u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c)) ≥ u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c))
(3.8)
Denote µ the Kuhn Tucker multiplier of the incentive compatibility and define
∆pi = pi − pi. The first order necessary conditions with k = k are
u′(c)(1 + µ
∆pi
pik
) = u′(c)(1− µ ∆pi
1− pik
), (3.9)
,
hence u′(c∗) < u′(c∗) and c∗ > c∗. Incentive compatibility requires that
consumption be state dependent and there is only imperfect consumption smoothing
and partial insurance: the social planner will allocate more consumption in good states
and less consumption in bad states. The larger µ, i.e the weight of the incentive
compatibility constraint, the higher consumption levels in good states and the lower in
bad states.
3.4.1 Tax Design
In this section we analyze how state dependent equilibrium consumption changes with
the revenue requirement. We therefore decompose consumption into two components
which we label level and spread component. The former is fully determined by the
budget constraint, the latter reflects incentive effects. Combining Equations (3.2) and
(3.7), we can write:
BC∗ : piky + (1− pik)y −G = pikc∗ + (1− pik)c∗ = c∗(G, δ = 0) (3.10)
In equilibrium, expected consumption under incentive based taxation equals
consumption under full information with no monitoring costs. In the following, we will
label c∗(G, δ = 0) ≡ c∗(G) benchmark consumption and refer to the ensuing equilibrium
welfare as benchmark Pareto frontier. Let c∗ ≡ c∗(G) + ∗(G) and c∗ ≡ c∗(G) + ∗(G).
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Thus,
c∗(G) = pik(c
∗(G)+∗(G))+(1−pik)(c∗(G)+∗(G)), with E[∗(G)] = 0 ∀G ≥ 0. (3.11)
At given G, the planner introduces a lottery over consumption and generates
uncertainty to meet incentive compatibility, with ∗i being the spread between
consumption in the realized state of nature i and expected consumption c∗.
Lemma 1. The spread in consumption has the following properties:
(i) The spread in consumption ∗i varies with G. The larger G, i.e. the smaller c
∗(G),
the smaller the spread: ′∗(G) < 0 and ′∗(G) > 0
(ii) The expected change in spreads due to an increase in G must equal zero:
pik
′∗(G) + (1− pik)′∗(G) = 0
The central idea of Lemma 1 is that higher government revenue leads to a more
’progressive’ tax system. 7 The spreads in consumption capture the variance in ex post
net income levels. When this variance is smaller, the tax system offers a larger degree
of social insurance and is more redistributive.
The mechanism at work is as follows. The government introduces uncertainty
over incomes to incentivize entrepreneurs to invest the socially optimal level of capital.
The spreads are chosen such that expected second period utility from high investment
compensates lower first period utility. Given concavity of u(.), at high G and low c∗
already small deviations from c∗ trigger the variance in state utilities necessary to meet
incentive compatibility. However, at low G and high c∗, the planner has to introduce a
relatively large spread for the same variance in utilities. Thus, the spread decreases in
G.
3.4.2 Incentive Costs and Government Revenue
Given that progressivity increases with G we now study how this effect influences
welfare. As entrepreneurs are risk averse, the spreads in consumption cause a loss in
7In this study, we use a broader definition of progressivity than in the traditional optimal taxation
literature where progressivity refers to marginal tax rates which we do not specify explicitly in this
chapter. Here, a tax system is progressive if low income is taxed less than high income.
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welfare which we label incentive costs. These costs can be increasing, decreasing or
constant in G. The size of incentive costs is determined by the difference between
benchmark welfare with zero monitoring costs, WC(G, 0), and welfare under the
incentive based taxation scheme, W IN(G), ∆W (G) = WC(G, 0) − W IN(G). In the
following we analyze how the costs of maintaining an incentive based taxation evolve
with G.
The Pareto frontier under an incentive based taxation scheme can be written as
W IN(G) = u(ω − k) + β(piku(c∗(G) + ∗(G)) + (1− pik)u(c∗(G) + ∗(G))). (3.12)
As incentive compatibility is binding in equilibrium for any G8, by taking the derivative
w.r.t G we know that
u′(c∗(G) + (G))(−1 + ′(G)) = u′(c∗(G) + (G))(−1 + ′(G)). (3.13)
Using Lemma 1 (i) and Equation (3.13), and taking the derivative of Equation (3.12)
w.r.t. G we see that welfare under incentive based taxation is strictly decreasing in G:
W ING (G) = −βu′(c∗(G) + (G))(1− ′(G)) < 0 ∀G,  ∈ {, } . (3.14)
Two forces are driving the decline in welfare, an income effect and a substitution
effect. First, transferring resources to the government lowers the level of consumption
for entrepreneurs. Second, by concavity of u(.), at lower consumption levels incentive
compatibility becomes less constraining and the government can substitute incentive
for insurance provision and spreads adapt.9
To see how incentive costs evolve in G, we analyze the difference between marginal
benchmark welfare and marginal incentive taxation welfare. By expressing spreads in
terms of marginal utility and applying Jensen’s inequality, we can infer conditions
determining whether the change in incentive costs is positive or negative, as stated in
8If incentive compatibility was not binding, the government could reduce consumption in the good
state and allocate more in the bad state, which would be Pareto improving.
9Note that although income and substitution effects are opposing forces, it is still possible that
incentive costs increase due to the impact of uncertainty on utility.
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Proposition 2.
Let a(c) = −u′′(c)
u′(c) be the coefficient of risk aversion and p(c) = −u
′′′(c)
u′′(c) be the
coefficient of prudence 10. Define P (c) = p(c)
a(c)
the ratio between prudence and risk
aversion, as in Low and Maldoom (2004). Risk aversion can be understood as the
demand for insurance whereas prudence or precautionary motives provide incentives for
capital investments in an uncertain environment, which reduces the need for insurance.
As summarized in Proposition 2, the welfare loss from incentive based taxation crucially
depends on the ratio of entrepreneurial prudence to risk aversion.
Proposition 2. Incentive costs
(i) are constant in G if and only if P (c) = 2,
(ii) decrease in G if and only if risk aversion dominates and the prudence to risk
aversion ratio is sufficiently small, P (c) < 2, and
(iii) increase in G if and only if precautionary motives dominate and the prudence to
risk aversion ratio is sufficiently large, P (c) > 2
Under incentive based taxation, the slope of the Pareto frontier for the respective
cases described in Proposition 2 is (i) equal; (ii) flatter; and (iii) steeper than the slope
of the benchmark Pareto frontier. If the ratio of risk aversion to prudence is increasing
with G, P ′(c) < 0,11 the slope, for instance, can first be flatter and then steeper than
the benchmark Pareto frontier. The latter cases are depicted in graphs 3.2, a-c.
The trade-off between demand for insurance and motivation to invest determines
the evolution of incentive costs. If entrepreneurs are sufficiently risk averse, the
spread necessary to provide appropriate investment incentives is small at lower
levels of consumption due to the curvature of u(.) and the increase in progressivity
due to an increase in G is strong.12 Moreover, a more progressive tax system is
10These coefficients are, in particular, analyzed in the context of precautionary saving behavior, see
Kimball (1990).
11Entrepreneurs with low consumption levels will be more inclined to invest while those with high
consumption levels are rather risk averse.
12A positive effect of risk aversion on progressivity has also been observed by Low and Maldoom
(2004) who consider a principle agent model with continuous effort choice but no revenue requirement.
The authors parametrize their model and find that risk aversion increases progressivity while
precautionary motives decrease progressivity.
50
a: Incentive costs are decreasing. b: Incentive costs are increasing. c: Incentive costs decreasing and increasing
Gmaxc(0) GmaxIN
W IN (G)
Gmaxc(0) GmaxINGmaxc(0)
G G
W IN (G)W IN (G)
GmaxIN
G
∆W
Wc(G, 0) Wc(G, 0) Wc(G, 0)
WIN (G) WIN (G) WIN (G)
Figure 3.2: Incentive Costs According to Preference Regime
particularly beneficial for aggregate welfare in case of dominating risk aversion and
small consumption levels. Therefore, if risk aversion is relatively large and dominates
precautionary incentives, a larger G reduces incentive costs.
In turn, more prudent entrepreneurs derive their investment incentives from
the possibility of achieving a high income. Reducing the high state income level by
smoothing consumption over states and transferring resources to the government deters
incentives more strongly as under dominance of risk aversion. Thus, the spread albeit
decreasing with G will decrease less quickly. An alternative explanation establishes
a link to the literature of precautionary savings. Here, agents behave prudently and
save more in one period when they face uncertain outcomes in the next period. The
larger the uncertainty the more agents are likely to save. For entrepreneurs, savings
corresponds to the capital investment that they don’t consume in the first period. A
prudent entrepreneur is thus less likely to invest if the consumption spread is small.
The above conditions can be expressed by all standard utility functions. Consider,
for instance, isoelastic utility functions within the HARA class. In their case, the
prudence to risk ratio is constant with P (c) = 1+ν
ν
, where ν is the coefficient of relative
risk aversion. Incentive costs decrease if CRRA risk aversion is sufficiently large, i.e.
ν > 1. Incentive costs also decrease under quadratic utility or CARA. Incentive costs
are constant, i.e. the decline in welfare with increasing G under incentive based taxation
and the benchmark case is equal, in case of log utility, where ν = 1. A sufficiently small
coefficient of risk aversion ν < 1 leads to an increase in incentive costs. Considering
non-HARA functions, the ratio P(c) will depend on the level of consumption and
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a combination of both regimes is possible. At low levels of consumption, prudence
dominates while risk aversion is more important at higher levels of consumption.
Several empirical studies attempt to measure the actual coefficient of relative
risk aversion of an economy. As summarized by Browning et al. (1999), the estimation
results from these studies vary from 0.64 to 4 with an average around 2.5. This would
suggest a prevalence of the insurance economy in our research. However, these studies
mainly rely on consumption data from the US. Entrepreneurial risk aversion is very
likely to be lower. Also, studies from emerging economies in Asia and Latin America
point towards relatively low levels of relative risk aversion for some countries13.
3.5 Optimal Revenue Collecting Mechanism
We have shown that under capital control higher monitoring costs amplify the decline
in welfare due to an increase in revenue requirement. Under incentive based taxation
costs can either exacerbate or dampen welfare losses depending on the ratio of prudence
to risk aversion, i.e. on the desire for insurance relative to the motivation to invest from
income uncertainty. As, by definition, the incentive tax Pareto frontier is independent
of monitoring costs, incentive taxation will be preferred more strongly the larger
monitoring costs.
The crucial question remains at which level of revenue requirement should the
government choose which system for a given δ. We answer the question by first
considering the benchmark welfare with zero monitoring cost. Subsequently, we define
an interval for positive monitoring costs such that both welfare functions intersect and
finally we analyze which system dominates before and after the intersection.
Comparing Incentive Taxation Welfare to Benchmark Welfare. If monitoring
costs of capital inputs δ equal zero, the government chooses capital control taxation
instead of incentive based taxation for any non-negative revenue requirement G which
13See, for instance, Panopoulou (2008).
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WC(G, δ)
WC(G, δ)
G
W (., .)
GmaxIN
W IN (G)
u(c∗0)
WC(G, δ)
WC(G, δ)
G
W (., .)
GmaxIN
W IN (G)
u(c∗0)
a: Insurance Economy b: Investment Economy
Figure 3.3: Intervals for Monitoring Costs
do not exceed the economy’s total surplus, piky + (1− pik)y.
WC(G, δ = 0) =u(ω − k) + βu(c∗(G))
=u(ω − k) + βu(piku(c∗(G)) + (1− pik)u(c∗(G)))
>u(ω − k) + β(piku(c∗(G)) + (1− pik)u(c∗(G))) = W IN(G) ∀G
Using Jensen’s inequality and concavity of u(.) we see that welfare with no monitoring
costs and perfect information on inputs is larger than welfare under the incentive based
taxation scheme.
Positive Monitoring Costs. To compare the entrepreneurs’ welfare under the two
taxation systems we will define a range for δ within which an intersection of the welfare
curves takes place. Let GmaxIN be the maximal government revenue which can be raised
under incentive based taxation and ∆W (0) the incentive costs at G = 0.
Lemma 3. There exists an interval [δ, δ] such that the two welfare curves intersect.
The cut-off value is denoted Go(δ) ∈ [0, GmaxIN ].
As can be also seen in Figure 3.3, if δ < δ, capital control is optimal for all G.
If δ > δ, the incentive based mechanism is optimal for all G. The interesting case
arises when monitoring costs are moderate and lie within the defined interval. If P(c)
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is decreasing in c, the two welfare curves intersect up to two times within the interval
[δ, δ], with cut-off values Go1(δ), G
o
2(δ) ∈ [0, GmaxIN ].
In the following we describe the choice path of the optimal revenue generating
mechanism dependent on the preference regime of the economy. We restrict attention
to ∆W (0) sufficiently small14 and moderate levels of monitoring costs δ ∈ [δ, δ]. The
proofs follow from the definition of the interval of monitoring costs, Lemma 3, and the
characterization of incentive costs, Proposition 2.
Insurance Economy. Entrepreneurs in this regime have a stronger preference for
insurance and ex post redistribution of outcomes and their risk aversion dominates
precautionary effects from investment. The government chooses interference into
control rights of capital for sufficiently small values of revenue requirement:
Proposition 4. When entrepreneurs are relatively more risk averse than prudent,
P (c) < 2 and (i) if G ∈ [0, Go(δ)], capital control dominates incentive based taxation;
and (ii) if G ∈ (Go(δ), GmaxIN ], incentive based taxation dominates capital control.
Under capital control, an increase in G translates into a pure income effect
which is amplified by the level of δ. Under incentive based taxation, an increase in
G triggers both an income and substitution effect, as described in Section 3.4.2 on
the nature of incentive costs. Entrepreneurial income decreases due to transfers to
the government. As entrepreneurs are risk averse, a lower income relaxes incentive
compatibility and the tax system can insure entrepreneurs more. Put differently, the
government can substitute incentive provision with insurance. In an insurance economy
with a large revenue requirement G, the curvature of the entrepreneurs’ utility function
is then bended enough to grant such a high level of insurance while meeting incentive
compatibility that the incentive tax triggers smaller welfare losses than capital control.
Investment Economy. Under this preference set, entrepreneurs face stronger
motivation to choose high capital investment and act in a precautionary matter when
facing risky future income. As a consequence, redistribution is less desirables than
14I.e. ∆W (0) < W = WC(0, 0)−W IN (0), with W IN (0) : W ING (G)|G=0 = WCG (G)|G=δ
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Figure 3.4: Optimal Revenue Generating Mechanism
under a social insurance economy. In this case, the government will choose capital
control taxation if the revenue requirement is sufficiently large:
Proposition 5. When entrepreneurs are relatively more prudent than risk averse,
P (c) > 2, and (i) if G ∈ [0, Go(δ)], incentive based taxation dominates capital control;
and (ii) if G ∈ (Go(δ), GmaxIN ], capital control dominates incentive based taxation.
Entrepreneurial motivation to invest is derived from the potential of achieving
a high output. By increasing G, the entrepreneurs’ intrinsic source of motivation is
eroding which slows down the reduction in spreads. Hence the substitution of incentive
provision by insurance can not be large enough to offset the losses in income from
additional transfers and uncertainty. Incentive costs increase, welfare losses become
more pronounced and, at a large enough revenue requirement, capital control offers a
higher level of welfare.
Finally, if the population’s demand for insurance is decreasing in income, the
government will choose capital control for low and high values of G, and implement
incentive based taxation for intermediate values of G. The optimal choice path of tax
systems for the respective regimes is depicted in Figure 3.4, a-c.
On the Role of Concavity With risk neutral entrepreneurs and linear utility,
u = ω − k + β(pic + (1 − pi)c), there is no need for the government to insure agents
across states and incentive costs are zero. Incentive taxation strictly dominates capital
control for all δ > 0 and G ∈ [0, Gmax], see Figure 3.5.
The only case for the government to interfere into the investment decision is
for small enough values of δ and high revenue requirements G > Gmax. In this case
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Mechanism with Risk Neutral Entrepreneurs
incentive compatibility requires more resources for c (c = 0) than the budget is able
to allocate. Hence, a mechanism based on incentive taxation is no longer feasible while
capital control is.
The third option: investing k and providing full insurance For some parameter
values of G and δ, it can be optimal for the government to smooth the agents’ second
period consumption perfectly and to allow for a higher first period consumption due
to lower investments (k-insurance). The existence of this option has no impact on
the properties of incentive costs as described above. Whether k-insurance is chosen
depends, in particular, on the output differential of the two technologies, Eky − Eky,
and monitoring costs δ.
If P (c) ≤ 2, the slope of k-insurance is always steeper than the slope of incentive
taxation: W ING > W
kins
G ∀ G. This can be derived from two inequalities: (i) welfare
under k-insurance is strictly lower than under first best and declines faster with G:
W FBG > W
kins
G due to a lower second period utility under k-insurance, Eky > Eky; (ii)
from section 3.4.2, we know that W ING > W
FB
G . Hence, if there exists an intersection
between the Pareto frontier of the incentive mechanism and the one of k-insurance,
then k-insurance will intersect from above. Whether there is an intersection depends
on the level of welfare at G = 0. The lower Eky, the lower the second period utility of
k-insurance (and the higher second period utility of incentive taxation) - this relation
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Figure 3.6: Insurance with Low Capital Investment
holds independent of the properties of the second and third derivative of the utility
function. Incentive taxation yields a higher welfare ∀G if, at G = 0 15
Eku(c) ≥
∆u0
β
+ u(Eky) (3.15)
Intuitively, the lower G, the more the agent can consume in the second period.
With concavity, the more the agent can consume in the second period, the less she is
inclined to invest in the first period. In addition, the value of consumption smoothing
(full insurance) in the second period decreases relatively to incentive provision with
larger G as incentive provision becomes cheaper. Put differently, if insurance is better
than incentives, then only for lower values of G.
Alternatively, even if condition 3.15 is not met, k-insurance is not necessarily
optimal as capital control could still yield higher welfare: If δ < Eky − Eky, the slope
of the Pareto frontier is flatter for the capital control mechanism than for k-insurance
and we can state the following inequality: W ING > W
C
G > W
kins
G . For capital control to
dominate k-insurance for all values of G, we need to assume that
δ ≤ Eky − u−1(∆u0 + βu(Eky)). (3.16)
Figure 3.6 depicts the above derived results.
15With log utility, the condition for incentive taxation always being better than k-insurance is:
Eky
Eky
≥ pik(ω−kω−k )
1−pik
∆piβ + (1 − pik)(ω−kω−k )
−pik
∆piβ . Log utility implies that P(c)=2, hence incentive costs are
constant. Then, there exists a δ > 0 such that for lower G control is optimal and for higher G incentive
taxation is optimal.
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If P (c) > 2, assumption 3.16 is still applicable for k-insurance not being optimal.
When analyzing the relation between k-insurance and incentive taxation we need to
consider an additional aspect: the slope of incentive taxation relative to k-insurance
can be larger, equal or lower (see also the comparison to the control mechanism, see
footnote 14). The intuition is that, although with lower G, the agent consumes more and
is less inclined to invest, the value of consumption smoothing becomes more important
at high values of G. There are hence two countervailing forces which determine the
relative position of the slopes. Assume that delta is not too small. Then, the optimal
revenue generating mechanism can not be, for instance, with increasing G: incentive
taxation, control, k-insurance. The following option, however is possible: k-insurance,
incentives, control. If delta is small enough or the output differential high enough, we
are back to the original sequence for increasing G: incentives, control.
In the following analysis we focus on the two main mechanisms, incentive
provision and control, and thus assume that k-insurance yields lower welfare than
any of the two mechanisms for all levels of G.
3.6 Analysis
3.6.1 Revenue Generation Under Wealth Heterogeneity
In this paragraph we consider the impact of an economy’s wealth distribution on
the above derived results about the government’s choice of its revenue collection
mechanism. We now assume that the distribution of wealth is no longer degenerate
but that the endowment ω is distributed over the interval [ω, ω], where ω ≥ k and the
distribution is exogenous.
When rearranging incentive compatibility we have the following inequality:
∆piβ(u(c)− u(c)) ≥ u(ω − k)− u(ω − k) (3.17)
The right hand side is the difference in first period utilities, ∆u(ω), which is due
to different capital needs of entrepreneurial projects. As ∂(∆u(ω))
∂ω
< 0, a higher level of
initial wealth ω leads to a smaller difference in first period utilities. The latter, in turn,
allows for a smaller spread in second period state dependent utility and thus lower
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incentive costs, ceteris paribus. As shown in in Paragraph 3.4.2 incentive compatibility
is binding in equilibrium. Hence - maintaining the assumption of no property taxes
- wealth heterogeneity has an impact on the contract the government designs under
incentive taxation while it has no influence on monitoring costs. We can thus derive
directly Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. For a given level of revenue requirement G and monitoring costs δ
(i) Incentive costs decrease with initial wealth ω.
(ii) There exists a wealth level ωˆ(G, δ), such that all entrepreneurs with higher initial
wealth, i.e. ω ≥ ωˆ(G, δ), are incentive-taxed and all entrepreneurs with lower initial
wealth, i.e. ω < ωˆ(G, δ), are controlled.
In a simplifying manner, Proposition 6 says that if the government faces a
population of agents who own capital and were to choose how to collect revenues
from their returns to capital, at given levels of monitoring costs the government would
provide incentives for the rich and control the poor.
This result can be taken to a different level of aggregation. Next to the
heterogeneity of wealth across entrepreneurs, we can also consider wealth inequality
across countries. A testable hypothesis with this regard would be that we should observe
more government interference in poorer countries and less control in richer economies.
Note that a similar result is obtained if a larger variance in the level of capital
investment k is considered.
3.6.2 Private Insurance Market
In their seminal paper on moral hazard economies, Prescott and Townsend (1984)
show that the first welfare theorem holds and competitive equilibrium allocations are
Pareto optimal in a decentralized insurance market for contracts with individually
effected and private information dependent options. One might argue that, in our
environment, private insurance firms can take over the job of insurance provision and
taxation becomes less costly for the government relative to capital control.
In the following, we will show that the existence of private insurance markets does
not change our results on the choice of the optimal revenue collection mechanism. Even
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though insurance is provided privately, governments facing a revenue requirementG will
still collect taxes from the agents ’insured’ state dependent gross income. For optimality,
taxes need to respect incentive compatibility and we face the same path of incentive
costs as under a purely public social security scheme. Obviously, the government could
also tax insurance companies directly instead of taxing entrepreneurs. This, again,
would not change the results. We would then compare capital control to taxation of
insurance companies which fully pass through their tax burden to entrepreneurs. The
resulting pricing schedule is the same as our previous tax schedule.
Consider an economy with free entry into the private insurance market and a
government facing a revenue requirement G. As in Prescott and Townsend (1984),
agents will choose the insurance contract which is best for them. Alike the State,
private firms have no information on the level of capital. They offer a state dependent
transfer m and collect the entrepreneurial output y. The government, in turn, taxes
state dependent income m and offers state dependent consumption c.
Without loss of generality, we assume that entrepreneurs announce truthfully the
level of capital they invested in their projects. Hence the optimal, incentive feasible
contract offered by competitive insurance firms smooths entrepreneurial income in the
second period16 and specifies the allocation of capital and state dependent insurance
payments {k,m,m}.
max
m,m≥0
u(ω − k) + β(piku(m) + (1− pik)u(m))
subject to
PCinsurance : piky + (1− pik)y ≥ pikm+ (1− pik)m+G
IC : u(ω − k) + β(piku(m) + (1− pik)u(m)) ≥ u(ω − k) + β(piku(m) + (1− pik)u(m))
The problem the insurance companies face is exactly the same problem the
government faces under section 3.4 with zero revenue requirement. Subsequently, in
equilibrium, there is only partial consumption smoothing and consumption spreads are
16For simplicity, we abstract from intertemporal insurance. Entrepreneurs could shift their wealth
over time which is optimal for them as we face discrete choice of capital. This does not change the
nature of our results and would be irrelevant if investment was continuous.
60
equal to those in section 3.4 when setting G = 0. It follows that the participation
constraint is binding as well as incentive compatibility.
Consider now the ’new’ optimization problem of the government which taxes the
second period gross state dependent income of all entrepreneurs, m,m:
max
c,c≥0
u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c))
subject to
BCgov : pikm+ (1− pik)m ≥ pikc+ (1− pik)c+G
IC : u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c)) ≥ u(ω − k) + β(piku(c) + (1− pik)u(c))
Comparing these two problems with the original environment without private insurance
market, it is obvious that the same second period consumption levels are reached. The
government simply pools expected insured income, which is equal to expected non-
insured income, collects G and allocates incentive compatible consumption levels as
before.
To summarize, private insurance firms improve the welfare of entrepreneurs by
partially smoothing their incomes. Figure 3.7 depicts starting point A of entrepreneurial
welfare without any insurance and point B with (private) insurance. As soon as the
government raises funds, expected second period consumption decreases and we see a
downward sloping welfare function w.r.t. G. See revenue level G’ (G”) and welfare at
point C’ (C”) in Figure 3.7. The government can only raise revenues optimally in an
incentive compatible way and this implies the same consumption schedule as we have
seen in section 3.4. Finally, the actual slope is determined by the ratio of prudence to
risk aversion.
Essentially, when considering again the role of the government in an economy
with no or imperfect insurance of entrepreneurial income, the government has two
roles: revenue collection and insurance provision, which can be interpreted as some
form of social security. In our environment, the insurance part can be ’out-sourced’
to a competitive insurance markets. If the government taxes entrepreneurs directly, it
insures entrepreneurs in addition to the insurance provided by the private insurer, as
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Figure 3.7: Private Insurance Market and Public Revenue Generation
consumption spreads decrease and progressivity increases with G. This does not affect
incentive costs and welfare and thus the decision whether to control capital investments
or not.
Note that this result, combined with our findings in the previous paragraph (3.6.1)
are clearly different to the insights from Newman (2007). He finds that with private
insurance markets poorer agents become entrepreneurs as opposed to wealthier ones.
The reason is the two period setup and the different role that wealth plays in this
model.
3.6.3 Continuous Capital Investment
If capital investment is no longer discrete but continuous and k ∈ [k, k] with ω >
k > k > 0, the above described properties of the two revenue generating mechanisms
are still valid. With continuous capital input, the government is able to (partially)
smooth the entrepreneurs’ consumption not only across states but also over time. Under
the incentive based mechanism, the government’s objective is to design a tax system,
{k∗, c∗, c∗} such that welfare is maximized and the resource constraint as well as the
entrepreneurs’ incentive compatibility are satisfied, with the latter being:
u′(ω − k) = βpi′(k)(u(c)− u(c)) (3.18)
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Whenever the government wants to implement a positive capital input k > 0
corresponding to the equilibrium contract, it needs to offer a positive spread in state
dependent utility, u(c)−u(c), and hence consumption for all entrepreneurs in the second
period, c > c.
Lemma 7. For all k > 0, second period consumption in the successful state must be
larger than consumption in the less successful state, c > c.
The positive consumption spread has exactly the same properties as in the discrete
case since Proposition 2 is valid irrespective of the number of levels of k.
Proposition 8. If P (c) < 2 and G increases, incentive costs decrease. If P (c) > 2 and
G increases, incentive costs increase.
This leaves us with the same slope properties of the efficiency frontier for the
incentive taxation mechanism as in the previous two level environment. With respect
to capital control, by definition, monitoring costs are independent of considerations on
incentive provision. With perfect information on continuous capital investment, perfect
consumption smoothing is possible, across states and over time. The slope, as before, is
determined by the level of revenue requirement and monitoring costs. Consequently, for
both mechanisms, the behavior of the efficiency frontiers with respect to the revenue
requirement is the same as under the previous discrete problem and the government’s
choice of the optimal revenue generating mechanism follows from Propositions 4 and
5.
3.7 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we augment the traditional optimal taxation problem with a binary
choice of the government about the tax system to use for the generation of revenue. We
first describe a tax system in which the government relies on controlling capital inputs
and pays for observability. Second, we characterize allocations under a tax system which
renounces to monitor capital inputs but designs an incentive compatible tax schedule.
Under both systems, costs arise from taxing entrepreneurial rents. But cost
structures are different along the feasible revenue requirement measure. When
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comparing these costs we find that interference into control rights is chosen (i) in
an investment economy, where prudence dominates risk aversion, for higher levels
of revenue requirement and (ii) in a social insurance economy, where risk aversion
dominates prudence, for lower levels of revenue requirement. An income effect and an
insurance/incentive substitution effect are the drivers of this result, with the ratio of
prudence to risk aversion leading the direction. Finally, these results are dependent on
the level of monitoring costs.
Real World Tax Systems. Obviously, both mechanisms, capital control and
incentive taxation, are not images of real world tax systems. However, capital control
can proxy an institutional set-up in which the government interferes into the control
rights of firms. Here, δ can also be interpreted as an output loss capturing inefficiency
of government control or ownership. Also, perfect consumption smoothing - as under
capital control - corresponds to a constant wage payment independent of the realization
of output.
Incentive based taxation can proxy a tax system in which firms report their
returns on balance sheets without documenting in detail the specific use of their capital
inputs making it intractable for tax authorities to pin down size of input and associated
project output. The resulting tax schedule is non-linear and automatic stabilizers
smooth consumption but do not fully insure against entrepreneurial risk.
The framework delivers a differentiated picture about the choice of the two tax
systems depending on several parameters which can be chosen according to country
specifics. Monitoring costs (or efficiency losses), for instance, vary from sector to sector
within an economy. They are potentially higher for services than for resource extraction.
Revenue requirement and, to some extent, the preference regime apply for the entire
economy, but vary significantly across countries.
Five implications of the model deserve emphasis. First, the higher the demand for
insurance, the relatively better the incentive based system.17 Second, at large revenue
requirements, capital control dominates incentive based taxation only if the economy
17Note that this result is counterintuitive at first glance when interpreting ex post insurance across
entrepreneurs as some form of social security. The stronger the preferences for social security, the
better performs incentive based taxation and not capital control.
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is sufficiently prudent. Third, for sectors or economies with high monitoring costs,
incentive based taxation yields a higher welfare than capital control independent of
revenue requirement and preference regime. Fourth, the wealthier an economy, the less
government interference is optimal and fifth, if there is heterogeneity in wealth across
entrepreneurs within the economy, there exists allocations in which it is optimal for
the government to incentive-tax rich entrepreneurs and control poor entrepreneurs.
Stylized Facts and Policy. How do these implications square with stylized facts?
Most developing economies, for instance, feature low government revenue as share of
their output: 15.2% of GDP on average over the past 20 years, according to IMF
(2011). Moreover, automatic stabilizers are rarely in place, suggesting a low degree
of consumption smoothing. If this correlates with a preference regime with low risk
aversion and demand for social insurance corresponding to an ’investment economy’,
incentive based taxation would be the optimal revenue generation mechanism. However,
if the revenue requirement in such an economy increases due to wars or natural
desasters, for instance, a shift to capital control taxation for sectors with low enough
monitoring costs would be efficient.
In advanced economies, in particular in European welfare states, the share of
the public sector to GDP is relatively high, averaging 41.5% of GDP for 30 OECD
countries (IMF (2011)). Moreover, tax systems are highly redistributive. If this goes
along with the economy’s demand for social insurance, incentive based taxation is the
welfare maximizing mechanism. This economy would be better off under capital control
only if the revenue requirement is reduced, i.e. by discovery of natural resources, for
instance.
To summarize, capital control is chosen under more unconventional combinations
of preferences and revenue requirement: first, if governments face a low revenue
requirement although the population has a high redistributive motive, and second, if a
high revenue requirement must be raised from a prudent, incentive driven population.
In these cases, interference into the control rights of capital input leads to a higher
welfare of exactly those who are taxed.
For the sake of tractability, the underlying theoretical framework abstracts from
some factors which potentially influence the decision of controlling capital such as
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labor input and thus labor taxation. It is also not possible for entrepreneurs to save.
These two extensions are subject to future work. Further, government revenue under
the current model is purely exogenous. It could be used for the provision of public
goods, for instance, which would enter the utility of entrepreneurs. Moreover, it would
be interesting to endogenize the revenue requirement by means of a political economy
framework. This positive extension to a so far normative environment would allow for
determining government revenue by an electorate with a given preference regime and
a government offering both, tax schedule and tax system associated with preferences
and revenue levels.
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3.A Technical Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1)
Incentive compatibility and can be written as:
u(c∗(G) + (G))− u(c∗(G) + (G)) = u(ω − k)− u(ω − k)
∆piβ
(3.19)
Assume ′(G) = 0, i.e. the spread in consumption  is independent of G. As incentive
compatibility is binding for any equilibrium given G ∈ [0, Gmax], a change in G must
meet
− u′(c∗(G) + (G)) + u′(c∗(G) + (G)) = 0 (3.20)
which is a contradiction, as u′(c∗) < u′(c∗) in equilibrium. Hence, spreads vary with G.
ad (i) :
pi′(G) + (1− pi)′(G)
= pi · lim
x→0
(G+ x)− (G)
x
+ (1− pi) lim
x→0
(G+ x)− (G)
x
, (x ∈ R)
= lim
x→0
1
x
{pi(G+ x) + (1− pi)(G+ x)− (pi(G) + (1− pi)(G))}
= 0
ad (ii): u′(c∗(G) + (G))(−1 + ′(G)) = u′(c∗(G) + (G))(−1 + ′(G)) and u′(c∗(G) +
(G)) < u′(c∗(G) + (G)) imply that ′(G) < ′(G). Assume ′(G) < 0∧ ′(G) < 0, this
contradicts (ii). Assume ′(G) > 0 ∧ ′(G) > 0, this also contradicts (ii). Therefore,
′(G) < 0 ∧ ′(G) > 0.
Proof. (Proposition 2)
Using Lemma 1 (ii) we can rewrite marginal welfare as
W ING (G) = −β
u′(c∗(G))u′(c∗(G))
piu′(c∗(G)) + (1− pi)u′(c∗(G)) < 0 ∀G. (3.21)
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Consider the following inequality:
W ING (G) > W
C,δ=0
G (G)
⇔ −β u
′(c∗(G))u′(c∗(G))
piu′(c∗(G)) + (1− pi)u′(c∗(G)) > −βu
′(c∗(G))
⇔ 1
u′(c∗(G))
< pi
1
u′(c∗(G))
+ (1− pi) 1
u′(c∗(G))
⇔ g(c∗) < pig(c∗) + (1− pi)g(c∗)
with g(c) ≡ 1
u′(c) . By Jensen’s inequality, W
IN
G (G) > W
C,δ=0
G (G) if and only if g(c) is
strictly convex ∀ G. Accordingly, W ING (G) < WC,δ=0G (G) if and only if g(c) is strictly
concave ∀ G. And, W ING (G) = WC,δ=0G (G) if and only if g(c) is linear. The second
derivative of g(c) is given by:
g′′(c) = −
u′′′(c)
u′′(c) − 2u
′′(c)
u′(c)
u′(c)2
u′′(c)
= −−p(c) + 2a(c)
u′(c)2
u′′(c)
ad(i): g(c) is linear if and only if p(c) = 2a(c)
ad(ii): g(c) is strictly convex if and only if p(c)
a(c)
= P (c) < 2
ad(iii): g(c) is strictly concave if and only if p(c)
a(c)
= P (c) > 2
Proof. (Lemma 3)
Let j ∈ {r, p, rp} denote the preference regime of the economy: j = r if risk aversion
dominates, i.e. P (c) ≤ 2, j = p if prudence dominates, P (c) ≥ 2, and j = rp if P(c)
depends on c and agents are relatively more risk aversion for small G and prudent for
large G. The interval limits are chosen such that the curves intersect at the minimum
or maximum feasible G under both systems, hence at 0 and GmaxIN : For ∆W (0) < W ,
define
δr and δ
p
:WC(GmaxIN , δj) = W IN(GmaxIN)
δ
r
and δp :WC(0, δj) = W IN(0)
Welfare is monotonously decreasing in G under both systems. If j = r, WC(0, δ) >
W IN(0) ∀ δ ≤ δr. From Proposition 2 we know that W ING (G) > WCG (G, 0) ≥
WCG (G, δ) ∀ δ, i.e. the welfare curve of incentive based taxation is flatter than the
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welfare function of capital control for all levels of monitoring costs. Hence, for any
δ ∈ [δr, δr], the two curves intersect.
If j = p and ∆W (0) < W , W IN(0) ≥ WC(0, δ) ∀ δ ≥ δp. From Proposition
2 and by definition of W , WCG (G, δ) > W
IN
G (G) for δ ∈ [δp, δ
p
] and the two curves
intersect.
Proof. (Proposition 4)
WCC(0, δ) > W IN(0) ∀ δ ≤ δr, and marginal welfare monotone and decreasing with
W ING (G) > W
C
G (G, 0). Thus, W
C(G, δ) > W IN(G) ∀G ∈ [0, Go(δ)] and WC(G, δ) <
W IN(G) ∀G ∈ (Go(δ), GmaxIN ].
Proof. (Proposition 5)
WC(0, δ) < W IN(0) ∀ δ ≤ δp, and marginal welfare monotone and decreasing with
W ING (G) < W
C
G (G, 0). Thus, W
C(G, δ) < W IN(G) ∀G ∈ [0, Go(δ)] and WC(G, δ) >
W IN(G) ∀G ∈ (Go(δ), GmaxIN ].
Proof. (Lemma 7)
The government chooses k s.t. entrepreneurs have no incentive to deviate:
u′(ω − k) = βpi′(k)(u(c)− u(c))
Assume c ≤ c, then entrepreneurs would choose k = 0.
Proof. (Proposition 8)
Lemma 7 shows that there exists a positive spread in consumption levels whenever
k > 0. Fix k > 0, the utility spread is determined by:
u(c)− u(c) = u
′(ω − k)
βpi′(k)
At lower levels of expected second period net income, the incentive compatible utility
spread requires a smaller spread in consumption due to concavity of u(.) - as with
discrete capital. Here, we can apply the reasoning from Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.
If P (c) < 2, marginal welfare is larger than first best marginal welfare (incentive costs
decrease). If P (c) > 2, marginal welfare is smaller than first best marginal welfare
(incentive costs increase).
Chapter 4
Incentive or Control II:
Heterogeneous Entrepreneurs
4.1 Introduction
Governments have a bad history in picking the winners.
The Economist, April 28 2011, On government intervention in the private sector.
This chapter analyzes revenue generating mechanisms in an economy with
skill heterogeneity of entrepreneurs. Facing private information on capital and
entrepreneurial skill, governments can choose between two mechanisms to collect
entrepreneurial returns: designing an incentive compatible tax schedule or controlling
capital input. The objective of this chapter is twofold. First, we consider how
equilibrium allocations change under both mechanisms with respect to our previous
findings in Chapter 3 when introducing heterogeneity of skills into the model. Second,
we analyze whether ”picking the losers”, hence controlling the low skilled entrepreneurs,
can be an optimal strategy for the government.
The study builds on the model from Chapter 3 and extends the analysis to a
framework which includes informational frictions leading to both, moral hazard and
adverse selection. This environment is analyzed, for instance, in Jullien et al. (2007).
In the previous chapter we have seen that it is optimal for a government, which faces
a given revenue requirement, to interfere into the investment decision of entrepreneurs
if taxing those entrepreneurs involves too costly distortions. This occurs under two
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circumstances. First, if the revenue requirement is small and entrepreneurs are more risk
averse than prudent; and second, if the revenue requirement is large and entrepreneurs
are more prudent than risk averse. The distortions in the tax mechanisms arise due to
moral hazard in the investment choice of the entrepreneur which triggers a trade-off
between insurance and efficiency: with capital investment being private information,
entrepreneurs have an incentive to reduce their investment when they are offered to
smooth their consumption.
When skills are heterogeneous, i.e. there exist different levels of productivity
among entrepreneurs, the welfare maximizing government offers consumption
smoothing across states and entrepreneurial types. With private information on both,
capital and productivity, this leads to moral hazard and adverse selection in the
tax mechanism and triggers incentive costs which reduce welfare. Controlling capital
investments is costly too, as the government pays monitoring costs (or efficiency
losses), but the cost structures is different to the one under incentive based taxation.
Moreover, we only consider government interference into one privately observed
variable, monitoring capital input and not entrepreneurial skill, as the government
can control capital but not the ideas and productivity of entrepreneurs.
In this environment, we find that low productivity entrepreneurs are more costly
to incentivize than high productivity entrepreneurs. In addition, the presence of low
productivity entrepreneurs increases the burden high productivity entrepreneurs have
to bear while taxation becomes less progressive implying a lower degree of consumption
smoothing. Precisely, the consumption spread due to incentive provision is equal in
equilibrium for low and high types with two dimensional private information. As a
consequence, the more heterogeneous an economy the more costly incentive provision
and the more often the government chooses capital control for revenue generation.
Finally, if the government decides to control one type of entrepreneurs only, it will
control low productivity entrepreneurs if the share of high productivity entrepreneurs
is not too large.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 briefly summarizes the model
environment which is described in detail in Section 3.2 and emphasizes the inclusion of
heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skill. In Section 4.3, the optimization problems for an
incentive compatible tax schedule are characterized and Section 4.4 analyzes the control
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of capital and the government’s choice on the optimal revenue generating mechanism.
Section 4.5 concludes. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
4.2 Model Environment With Skill Heterogeneity
A welfare maximizing government faces a continuum of ex ante identical entrepreneurs
who live for two periods. Entrepreneurs invest their own capital in the first period
and earn stochastic returns on these investments in the second period. There are two
types of entrepreneurs, high productivity agents (H) earn a larger return on the same
amount invested than low productivity agents (L). Their lifetime utility depends on
consumption in Period 1 and 2 and is given by
U(k, cθ, cθ) = u(ω − k) + β(piθku(cθ) + (1− piθk)u(cθ)). (4.1)
cθ denotes second period consumption in the successful state for an entrepreneur
of type θ ∈ Θ = {H,L} and cθ denotes second period consumption in the less successful
state. Note that θ can also be interpreted as the quality of the agent’s entrepreneurial
idea or innovation.
First period consumption is the difference between initial wealth endowment, ω,
and capital investment, k. Assume for simplicity that the distribution of initial capital
is degenerate at ω. Entrepreneurs can choose whether to realize their idea θ with a
low capital technology or a capital intensive technology and thus to transfer a small
or large amount of their initial wealth to their firms, k ∈ {k, k}, with 0 < k < k ≤ ω.
Higher investments lead to lower consumption in the first period but higher expected
return in the second period.
As before, empirically, this assumption can be interpreted as entrepreneurs
choosing between two projects with different refinance conditions while the output
in monetary terms does not inform about types of projects. Denote y the random gross
return on capital which is produced with the following technology:
y =
 y with probability piθky with probability 1− piθk
with y > y, piH
k
> piHk , pi
L
k
> piLk and
piH
k
−piHk
piH
k
>
piL
k
−piLk
piL
k
. The expected return is thus
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increasing in capital and type. For single crossing, we need the additional assumption
that high productivity entrepreneurs have a higher probability to succeed than low
types even if they invest a low level of capital only, i.e. piHk > pi
L
k
, similar to Faynzilberg
and Kumar (2000). Laffont and Martimort (2002) call this assumption that the ranking
among types is strong.
We make the following assumptions on utility: discount factor β ∈ (0, 1), u′(.) >
0, u′′(.) < 0, limc→0 u′(c) =∞, limc→∞ u′(c) = 0. As in Chapter 3, the government has
to meet an external revenue requirement G and taxes entrepreneurial income in the
second period. We consider a government deciding on net income or consumption levels
cH , cH , cL, cL directly, which corresponds to the decentralized tax schedule T (y, k, θ).
Initial endowment ω is public information, as well as output and its distribution.
Capital investment k and productivity θ are private information of the entrepreneurs
and unknown to the revenue collecting government. In order to understand the
underlying dynamics we will start with perfect and partial information on k and θ
in Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 before we look at two-dimensional private information
in Section 4.3.4. Further, it is possible for the government to monitor capital investment
k at costs δ, which will be introduced in Section 4.4.
For efficiency in the moral hazard problem, we will assume that the following
condition holds:
u′(w − k)
u′(Ek[cθ(G)])
≤ βpiθ′
k
(y − y) ∀ θ,G ∈ [0, Gmax] (4.2)
Eθk denotes the expectation operator w.r.t. the entrepreneur’s productivity θ
and capital input k. Equation (4.2) implies that it is efficient for the government to
implement a high capital investment for all feasible levels of revenue requirement and
both types. It also implies that the marginal rate of transformation is large enough to
sustain high investments from low types even at heavy rate of cross-subsidization.
Note that this precludes a shut down of low productivity types. We thus neglect
the exclusion of low productivity entrepreneurs on purpose as this is a well-studied
phenomenon in an adverse selection environment and does not constitute the focus of
this chapter. Consequently, Equation (4.2) implies voluntary participation in the tax
mechanism of both types of entrepreneurs. Finally, a direct mechanism specifies the
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contract {k, (cH , cH), (cL, cL)}.
In the following, we assume that it is optimal for the government to implement
k for all values of G and for both types. We thus do not consider an additional option,
k-insurance, in which the government would allocate low capital investment in the first
period but grant full insurance in the second period. In this sense, our results in this
chapter are partial in nature.
4.3 Taxing Entrepreneurial Returns
The government faces the following problem: First, it needs to raise revenue G by
taxing its population of entrepreneurs. Second, it wants to maximize the agents’
welfare and thus smooth consumption in the second period between a successful state
and a less successful state. Thus, the government offers to insure entrepreneurs. This
implies that it taxes successful entrepreneurs more than unsuccessful ones (or even
subsidizes the latter) and hereby provides social insurance. As investments can not
be observed without costs, the government needs to design a tax schedule which is
incentive compatible with the socially optimal level of capital investment k. Moreover,
entrepreneurs’ skills are heterogeneous and the government cannot observe which agent
is more productive than the other. Therefore, the government faces a two-dimensional
information problem which gives rise to moral hazard due to unobserved capital input
and adverse selection due to heterogeneous productivity.
Before specifying the optimal contract offered by the government it is important
to understand which distortions arise from each source of private information. We
therefore discuss in the following equilibrium allocations when the government has
(i) perfect information on both capital and technology, (ii) perfect information on
productivity but not on capital, and (iii) perfect information on capital but not on
productivity.
4.3.1 Perfect Information on Capital and Productivity
We first characterize the unconstrained allocation of consumption and capital
investment,
{
k∗, (cH∗, cH∗), (cL∗, cL∗)
}
, assuming the government has access to
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information on capital and productivity. Let q be the share of high productivity
entrepreneurs in the population. The optimization problem for the welfare maximizing
government is the following:
max
cH ,cH ,cL,cL≥0
q(u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)]) + (1− q)(u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)])
subject to
BC : q · EHk [y] + (1− q) · ELk [y] ≥ q · EHk [cH ] + (1− q) · ELk [cL] +G (4.3)
In equilibrium, the government sets k = k for all feasible G ∈ [0, Gmax] and
cH = cH = cL = cL = c∗. The entrepreneurs’ consumption is perfectly smoothed
across states and across types and the consumption level is determined by the revenue
requirement:
BC : c∗(G) = q · EH
k
[y] + (1− q) · EL
k
[y]−G (4.4)
4.3.2 Private Information on Capital
Let us now assume that the government has no information on the capital invested
by entrepreneurs but observes their productivity. This is the case, for instance, when
educational degrees reflect entrepreneurial innovation and skill. The government can
verify the entrepreneurs’ educational background while it is unable to track the
invested capital and technology used to realize the project. In this pure moral hazard
environment, the optimization problem takes into account two incentive compatibility
conditions to maintain high capital investments by both types of entrepreneurs:
max
cH ,cH ,cL,cL≥0
q(u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)]) + (1− q)(u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)])
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subject to
BC : q · EHk [y] + (1− q) · ELk [y] ≥ q · EHk [cH ] + (1− q) · ELk [cL] +G (4.5)
ICH1 : u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] (4.6)
ICL1 : u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] (4.7)
The government chooses consumption levels such that the first order conditions
are satisfied:
piH
k
1
u′(cH)
+ (1− piH
k
)
1
u′(cH)
= piL
k
1
u′(cL)
+ (1− piL
k
)
1
u′(cL)
(4.8)
In equilibrium, perfect consumption smoothing is no longer possible and the
government needs to provide incentives for entrepreneurs to produce with the socially
optimal level of capital. We therefore have cH > cH and cL > cL such that both types’
incentive compatibility conditions are met 1:
u(cH)− u(cH) = ∆u0
∆piHβ
(4.9)
u(cL)− u(cL) = ∆u0
∆piLβ
(4.10)
where ∆u0 = u(ω−k)−u(ω−k) and ∆piθ = piθk−piθk. Note that when comparing
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) the utility spread for low productivity entrepreneurs is
larger than for high productivity entrepreneurs. We will summarize this property in
the following Lemma:
Lemma 9. With a welfare maximizing government and a single resource constraint,
taxation of low productivity entrepreneurs implies larger distortions from incentive
provision than taxation of high productivity entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs’ Welfare Lemma 9 allows us to analyze the welfare of the individual
types of entrepreneurs. If the agents are as prudent as risk averse, P (c) = 2, low
1Incentive compatibility conditions are binding in equilibrium. If they weren’t the government
could improve the welfare of entrepreneurs by granting a smaller consumption spread.
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productivity entrepreneurs are worse off than high productivity entrepreneurs. This
is also the case, if the agents are more risk averse than prudent, P (c) < 2. Whereas
low types are better off for some parameter settings, when P (c) > 2. Subsequently,
higher costs for incentive provision stemming from the presence of low productivity
entrepreneurs are also borne by high productivity entrepreneurs. We will come back to
this observation later as the low type externalities generate scope for the government
to improve upon the current allocation.
4.3.3 Private Information on Productivity
In the following, we assume that the government can observe technology and capital
input but does not know the entrepreneurs’ productivity.
max
cH ,cH ,cL,cL≥0
q(u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)]) + (1− q)(u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)])
subject to
BC : q · EHk [y] + (1− q) · ELk [y] ≥ q · EHk [cH ] + (1− q) · ELk [cL] +G (4.11)
ICH2 : E
H
k
[u(cH)] ≥ EH
k
[u(cL)] (4.12)
ICL2 : E
L
k
[u(cL)] ≥ EL
k
[u(cH)] (4.13)
In this environment, it is straight forward to see that first best consumption
smoothing can be implemented, cH = cH = cL = cL = c∗(G), while incentive
compatibility is satisfied. If capital input and thus technology is known, there is no
distortion from heterogeneous types of entrepreneurs and adverse selection does not
occur. Moral hazard is thus the principle source of distortions in an environment with
private information on both, capital and productivity. Subsequently, if the government
had to decide which private information problem to resolve by monitoring it would
choose capital, not entrepreneurial skill, and obtain full consumption smoothing across
state and type. Lemma 10 follows directly from the equilibrium allocation specified
above.
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Lemma 10. In an economy with unobserved productivity and capital, and
entrepreneurs choosing between two investment levels, the government can allocate
full insurance and perfect consumption smoothing by monitoring capital inputs of all
entrepreneurs.
This result is, in part, a consequence of the simplified modeling of first period
utility and the restriction to two capital levels. With continuous capital, the planner
would like to allocate kH∗ > kL∗. This, however, is not incentive compatible. The
high productivity agent will mimic the low productivity agent and the planner chooses
cL < cL, kH = kH∗. Capital investment of the low type is either lower, higher or equal
to the optimal level, depending on the properties of the utility function.
To summarize, the continuous case involves more complex equilibrium outcomes
with one source of private information only. Hence, restricting our attention to the
discrete case is a necessary assumption to keep the model tractable in the following
sections. Moreover, it is interesting to look at the simplified version as typical properties
of adverse selection will occur once we allow for both information asymmetries.
As in Chapter 3, we can understand the underlying production technology as two
business operations with different financing conditions which can be launched by all
entrepreneurs in the economy.
4.3.4 Private Information on Capital and Productivity
Consider now a government which can neither observe technology nor productivity
of entrepreneurs and faces two potential sources of distortions: moral hazard due to
unknown technology and adverse selection due to heterogeneous entrepreneurial skills.
This situation occurs, for instance, when the government could observe education which
is a proxy for the skill level but cannot condition on a diploma in a tax schedule as the
legal framework prohibits discrimination with respect to degrees.
max
cH ,cH ,cL,cL≥0
q(u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)]) + (1− q)(u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)])
78
subject to
BC : q · EHk [y] + (1− q) · ELk [y] ≥ q · EHk [cH ] + (1− q) · ELk [cL] +G (4.14)
ICH1 : u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] (4.15)
ICL1 : u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] (4.16)
ICH2 : E
H
k
[u(cH)] ≥ EH
k
[u(cL)] (4.17)
ICL2 : E
L
k
[u(cL)] ≥ EL
k
[u(cH)] (4.18)
ICH3 : u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cL)] (4.19)
ICL3 : u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cH)] (4.20)
Equations (4.15) to (4.18) are known from Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3. Two
informational frictions give rise to the possibility of double deviation captured in
equations (4.19) and (4.20). It is easy to verify that both conditions are slack, as
ICL1 and IC
H
2 imply IC
H
3 , and IC
L
2 more restrictive than IC
L
3 . We can further derive
Lemma 11 when combining the above constraints.
Lemma 11. If productivity and capital are private information of entrepreneurs, then,
in equilibrium, the spread of state dependent consumption levels for high productivity
entrepreneurs is larger than or equal to the spread of consumption for low productivity
entrepreneurs.
This information helps us to find the equilibrium to the optimization problem.
Proposition 12. The government offers a pooling contract with partial consumption
smoothing, cH = cL > cH = cL while the spread in consumption levels is determined by
low type incentive compatibility, u(cL)−u(cL) = ∆u0
∆piLβ
. The pooling contract dominates
the separating contract for all G ∈ [0, Gmax].
The equilibrium tax schedule offered by the government can be characterized
accordingly. Since both types of entrepreneurs have the same consumption level when
they are in the same state, the tax system is progressive in two regards. First, tax
payments to the government are larger in successful states than in unsuccessful ones
and second, high productivity agents pay more on average than low productivity agents.
As before, there exists a welfare loss from the provision of incentives for using the capital
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intensive technology. However, instead of offering a utility spread of ∆u0
∆piHβ
to the high
types as under Section 4.3.2, the government has to offer ∆u0
∆piLβ
for both types. Hence,
high types face the same lottery on consumption as low types and incentive costs
are larger for high productivity entrepreneurs than under pure moral hazard. While
heterogeneous productivity alone has not caused distortions, it increases the incentive
costs the government has to take into account when raising the revenue G and neither
capital nor productivity is observed. As a consequence, high productivity types bear an
important share of the welfare loss caused by variations in entrepreneurial productivity.
Comparing this result to an economy with homogeneous entrepreneurial skill supports
this conclusion.
Homogeneous versus Heterogeneous Entrepreneur Economy Consider an
economy with homogeneous entrepreneurs producing expected output
Ehomo
k
[y] = pihomo
k
· y + (1− pihomo
k
) · y (4.21)
and an economy with heterogeneous entrepreneurs producing the same aggregate
output
Eθ
k
[y] = q(piH
k
· y + (1− piH
k
) · y) + (1− q)(piL
k
· y + (1− piL
k
) · y) = Ehomo
k
[y]. (4.22)
Assume further that entrepreneurs in the homogeneous economy have the average skill
level of the heterogeneous economy w.r.t both capital investments. Then, according
to Proposition 12, utility spreads of the low types determine the tax schedule for all
entrepreneurs in the heterogeneous economy while a smaller utility spread is possible
in the homogeneous economy. It follows directly:
Proposition 13. A government designing an incentive compatible tax schedule for
entrepreneurs faces larger welfare losses from incentive provision in a heterogeneous
economy than in a homogeneous economy.
This is a familiar result of principle agent problems with two-dimensional private
information and when adverse selection happens before moral hazard, as described
for instance in Laffont and Martimort (2002). Figure 4.1 depicts this result, with
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Figure 4.1: Homogenous vs Heterogenous Entrepreneur Economy
W IN,homo(G) being the welfare in the homogeneous economy and W IN,θ(G) being the
aggregate welfare with different productivity types. The graph shows aggregate welfare
with respect to government revenue.
The distinction between Insurance and Investment Economy follows from Chapter
3 and refers to preferences on risk aversion and prudence in the economy. In the former,
risk aversion dominates prudence, P (c) < 2, and in the latter, prudence dominates risk
aversion, P (c) > 2. The same applies for the shape of the graphs, which reflects the
evolution of incentive costs under the two preference sets. Welfare losses from incentive
provision decrease in an Insurance Economy and increase in an Investment Economy.
4.4 Controlling Heterogeneous Entrepreneurs
Having characterized equilibrium tax schedules under incentive based taxation, we will
discuss a second option for governmental revenue collection in the following: the control
of capital inputs. Precisely, we will analyze when it is optimal for the government to
control capital investments of high type, low type, or both types of entrepreneurs.
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4.4.1 Control With Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Controlling High and Low Skilled Entrepreneurs. As under Chapter 3, the
government can choose between two mechanisms to raise revenue from entrepreneurial
returns when capital input is unobserved. First, providing incentives for entrepreneurs
to invest the socially optimal level, and second, controlling capital investment directly
at monitoring costs δ. These monitoring costs enter the government budget and the
government faces a similar optimization problem as under Section 4.3.1 with the budget
constraint as
BCC : q · EHk [y] + (1− q) · ELk [y] ≥ q · EHk [cH ] + (1− q) · ELk [cL] +G+ δ (4.23)
Consequently, equilibrium allocations are cH = cH = cL = cL = c∗(G, δ). When
increasing the revenue requirement G, welfare under the control mechanism evolves
very differently than welfare under the incentive mechanism. The variation in G has an
impact on the consumption spread and thus on incentive costs while it has no impact
on monitoring costs. In Chapter 3 we draw conclusions on the choice of the optimal
revenue generating mechanisms at given preferences for insurance and levels of revenue
requirement. By introducing heterogeneity in skill levels, incentive costs are larger for
all levels of G as described above and depicted in Figure 4.1. As a consequence, incentive
based taxation performs worse relative to capital control (of both entrepreneurial types)
than before: (i) the government switches from incentives to control already for smaller
values of G in the Investment Economy (P (c) > 2); and (ii) keeps on controlling
capital investments longer, i.e. for higher values of G, before switching to incentives in
the Insurance Economy (P (c) < 2), see also Go1 to G
o
4 in Figure 4.1.
Diversification of Skill. We continue to assume that the government controls both
types of entrepreneurs if it chooses capital control as revenue generating mechanism.
Keeping aggregate output constant but increasing the difference in productivity of
entrepreneurs under the capital intensive technology, piH
k
− piL
k
, yields a higher utility
spread for low types, ∆u0
β∆piL
↑, and a smaller utility spread for high types, ∆u0
β∆piH
↓.
Since the government offers a pooling equilibrium contract with low type incentive
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compatibility determining consumption levels for both types, we can derive the
following conclusion on the impact of skill heterogeneity:
Proposition 14. The more heterogeneous an economy the more costly incentive
provision and the more often it is optimal for the government to choose capital control
for revenue generation.
Controlling Low Skilled Entrepreneurs. In the following we consider the
possibility to monitor only one type of entrepreneur. In this environment, offering
control (and consumption smoothing) to low types has an impact on the mimicking
behavior of high types. The government therefore reduces the allocated consumption to
low types and/or introduces a spread for low type consumption, too. The government
faces the following optimization problem:
max
cH ,cH ,cL,cL≥0
q(u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)]) + (1− q)(u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)])
subject to
BC : qEHk [y] + (1− q)ELk [y] ≥ qEHk [cH ] + (1− q)ELk [cL] +G+ (1− q)δ (4.24)
ICH1 : u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βEHk [u(cH)] (4.25)
ICL1 : − (4.26)
ICH2 : E
H
k
[u(cH)] ≥ EH
k
[u(cL)] (4.27)
ICL2 : E
L
k
[u(cL)] ≥ EL
k
[u(cH)] (4.28)
ICH3 : − (4.29)
ICL3 : u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cL)] ≥ u(ω − k) + βELk [u(cH)] (4.30)
Note that monitoring costs enter the budget constraint on the right hand side
multiplied with the share of low skilled entrepreneurs that the government controls.
Subsequently, monitoring one type only is less costly in terms of monitoring costs than
controlling two types. However, 1-type-control triggers incentive costs in addition to
monitoring costs as high types have to be incentivized to invest and prevented from
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mimicking low types. The equilibrium can be described accordingly.
Proposition 15. In equilibrium, low types are not offered perfect consumption
smoothing for the entire choice set. High types face a spread in consumption according
to ICH1 : u(c
H)− u(cH) = ∆u0
∆piHβ
.
A similar result occurs if the government aims at controlling high types only. Low
types are offered state dependent consumption at according to ICL1 : u(c
L)− u(cL) =
∆u0
∆piLβ
while high type consumption cannot be fully smoothed for the entire choice set.
Optimal Revenue Generation. Assume, for instance, the economy is relatively
more risk averse than prudent, P (c) < 2. For δ not too large, the overall welfare
under 2-type control is higher than under 1-type-control and higher than under full
incentive provision as one constraint is removed and, for L-type-control, the spread is
smaller. Welfare under control of both types declines more quickly with δ than welfare
with one-type control, as monitoring costs are paid for all entrepreneurs and not only
for the share of the respective type. There are thus parameter values such that the
optimal revenue generation mechanism is 2-type-control for low values of the revenue
requirement, 1-type-control for intermediate values and full incentive provision for large
values of G. The decision about which type of entrepreneur to control, however, depends
on the share q. We can analyze this choice in more detail when considering pure moral
hazard only.
4.4.2 Control With Pure Moral Hazard
If the government has information on productivity, and decides to control one type
of entrepreneurs, it could either choose to control low type entrepreneurs, with
consumption allocations cH > cL = cL > cH such that ICH1 and BC are equalized.
Or the government could choose to control high type entrepreneurs, with consumption
allocations cL > cH = cH > cL.
The government pools all resources in its budget constraint and allocates
consumption levels such that expected inverse marginal utilities equalize. As
incentivizing low types is always more costly in terms of welfare than incentivizing
high types, we can write as a consequence of Lemma 9:
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Figure 4.2: Controlling Low Productivity Entrepreneurs Under Pure Moral Hazard
Lemma 16. For zero monitoring costs, controlling L types dominates controlling H
types if the share of H types is not too large.
We can further derive properties of marginal welfare under the four mechanisms.
Proposition 17. Marginal Welfare of Control and Incentive Mechanisms:
(i) If P (c) < 2 and δ ≥ 0, welfare under 2-type-control decreases faster with G
than welfare under 1-type-control which decreases faster than welfare under pure
incentive provision: W ING > W
θ
G > W
C
G , for θ = H,L.
(ii) If P (c) > 2 and δ ≥ 0, welfare under pure incentive provision decreases faster
with G than welfare under 1-type-control which decreases faster than welfare under
2-type-control: WCG > W
θ
G > W
IN
G , forθ = H,L and δ not too large.
Note that W ING > W
Hcontr
G > W
Lcontr
G > W
C
G for P (c) < 2 and δ = 0 as well as
W ING < W
Hcontr
G < W
Lcontr
G < W
C
G for P (c) > 2 and δ = 0. This holds true for nonzero
values of δ if and only if the share of high skilled entrepreneurs is moderate. Hence, with
positive monitoring costs, marginal welfare depends on the share of respective types in
the economy. If q is low, (1 − q)δ is large and expected consumption under low type
control is lower than expected consumption under high type control: c∗Lcontr > c∗Hcontr.
For q large enough, this can, e.g. for P (c) < 2, lead to steeper marginal welfare under
low type control than under high type control.
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Proposition 18. At moderate levels of δ and q,
(i) and P (c) > 2, it is optimal for a government to control all entrepreneurs for low
values of G, control low skilled entrepreneurs at moderate values of G and provide
incentives for high values of G.
(ii) and P (c) < 2, it is optimal for a government to provide incentives for low values
of G, control low skilled entrepreneurs at moderated values of G and control all
entrepreneurs for high values of G.
Note that in an insurance economy, there exist parameter constellation such that
it is optimal to first control low types, then high types and then to provide incentives
for both.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines the role of adverse selection and moral hazard in the context
of optimal capital taxation. It elaborates on the results of the study from Chapter 3
and adds the following insights to the analysis. First, we find that low productivity
entrepreneurs are more costly to incentivize than high productivity entrepreneurs.
In addition, the presence of low productivity entrepreneurs increases the burden
high productivity entrepreneurs have to bear while taxation becomes less progressive
implying a lower degree of consumption smoothing.
Second, the more heterogeneous an economy the more costly incentive provision
and the more often the government chooses capital control for revenue generation.
And third, if the government decides to control one type of entrepreneurs only, it will
control low productivity entrepreneurs if the share of high productivity entrepreneurs
is not too large. Overall, it is not necessarily bad for governments to have a bad history
in picking the winners. There are situations in which it is indeed optimal to pick the
losers.
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4.A Technical Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 9)
ICH1 and IC
L
1 are binding in equilibrium and
u(cH)− u(cH) = ∆u0
∆piHβ
<
∆u0
∆piLβ
= u(cL)− u(cL) (4.31)
as piH
k
− piHk > piLk − piLk . Given a single resource constraint and concave utility, the
government cross-subsidizes to smooth consumption across entrepreneurs. A larger
spread in utility between the two states implies a lower level of aggregate welfare
at given expected consumption.
Proof. (Lemma 10)
The Lemma follows directly from the preceding equilibrium allocations. The
equilibrium tax schedule to the problem in Section 4.3.3 offers cH = cH = cL = cL =
c∗(G), i.e. full insurance when capital is observed. The tax schedule to the problem in
Section 4.3.2 offers partial insurance only. If monitoring is costly and costs are the same
for capital and productivity, then welfare is larger when monitoring capital inputs than
when monitoring productivity.
Proof. (Lemma 11)
ICH2 and IC
L
2 are satisfied simultaneously if c
H ≥ cL ∧ cL ≥ cH . Combining ICH2 and
ICL2 , we know that
1−piL
k
piL
k
(u(cL) − u(cH)) ≥ 1−pi
H
k
piH
k
(u(cL) − u(cH)). u(cL) − u(cH) < 0
yields a contradiction, hence cL ≥ cH . As u(cH) − u(cL) ≥ 1−pi
H
k
piH
k
(u(cL) − u(cH)), it
follows that cH ≥ cL.
In the following, subscripts (k) are omitted without loss of generality.
Proof. (Proposition 12)
Lemma 11 states that the consumption spread of high types must be equal to or larger
than the spread of low types. Assume the government offers cH = cL and cH > cL while
respecting incentive compatibility and budget. Since the resource constraint is binding,
the government can allocate
c∗ = (qpiH + (1− q)piL)c+ (q(1− piH) + (1− q)(1− piL))c, (4.32)
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and cH > cL such that
(qpiH + (1− q)piL)c = qpiHcH + (1− q)piLcL. (4.33)
Then, by Jensen’s inequality,
u(c) ≥ qpi
H
qpiH + (1− q)piLu(c
H) +
(1− q)piL
qpiH + (1− q)piLu(c
L) ⇔
(qpiH + (1− q)piL)u(c) ≥ qpiHu(cH) + (1− q)piLu(cL) ⇔
E[u(c, c)] ≥ E[u(cH , cL, c)]
and the above consumption allocations cannot be optimal. It is always possible to
increase welfare by reducing the spread in consumption between types at a given state
and the government offers the smallest spread possible across states to both types.
Further, the pooling contract is the unique equilibrium since any contract which
aims at separating the two types while being incentive compatible involves a larger
spread for the high types.
The proof for Proposition 13 follows from Proposition 12.
The proof for Proposition 14 follows from the text.
Proof. (Proposition 15)
Incentive compatibility is binding for H types. If it were not the planner would reduce
the spread and increase welfare.
Proof. (Lemma 16)
Assume q = 0, then controlling low types yields higher utility. Assume q = 1, then
controlling high types yields higher utility. For q ∈ (0, 1), the following equation holds
if q is not too large:
q(piHu(cH)+(1−piH)u(cH))+(1−q)u(cL) > qu(cH)+(1−q)q(piLu(cL)+(1−piL)u(cL))
(4.34)
Note that with equal shares, control of high low types yields higher utility as spreads
are larger for the control of high types.
88
Proof. (Proposition 17)
Assume δ = 0. First order conditions of both, L-type and H-type optimization problems
are
piH
k
1
u′(cH)
+ (1− piH
k
)
1
u′(cH)
=
1
u′(cL)
(4.35)
piL
k
1
u′(cL)
+ (1− piL
k
)
1
u′(cL)
=
1
u′(cH)
(4.36)
Using Proposition 2, Chapter 3, and Equations 4.35 and 4.36, marginal welfare
can be written as:
1
WCG
= − 1
β
1
u′(c∗(G))
1
WLcontrG
= − 1
β
1
u′(cH(G))u′(cH(G))
piHu′(cH(G))+(1−piH)u′(cH(G)) + u
′(cL(G))
= − 1
β
1
2
1
u′(cL(G))
= − 1
β
1
2
(q(piH
1
u′(cH(G))
+ (1− piH) 1
u′(cH(G))
) + (1− q) 1
u′(cL(G))
)
1
WHcontrG
= − 1
β
1
2
1
u′(cH(G))
Note that
c∗(G) = q(piHcH(G) + (1− piH)cH(G)) + (1− q)cL(G)
= qcH(G) + (1− q)(piLcL(G) + (1− piL)cL(G))
(i) If P (c) < 2 and thus 1
u′(.) a convex function, combining Equations 4.8, 4.35 and
4.36, and applying Jensen’s inequality we know that:
piH
1
u′(cHIN)
+ (1− piH) 1
u′(cHIN)
>
1
u′(cH)
>
1
u′(cL)
>
1
u′(c∗)
(4.37)
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This is also shown by graph 4.3, a. We can derive the following inequalities:
W ING > W
Hcontrol
G > W
Lcontrol
G > W
C
G (4.38)
A positive δ has no impact on W ING , but decreases marginal welfare of the control
mechanisms further. As it enters the budget constraint with q < 1 under 1-type-
control, marginal welfare of 2-type-control is smaller than marginal welfare of
1-type-control for all G.
(ii) If P (c) > 2 and thus 1
u′(.) a concave function, combining Equations 4.8, 4.35 and
4.36, and applying Jensen’s inequality we know that:
1
u′(c∗)
>
1
u′(cL)
>
1
u′(cH)
> piH
1
u′(cHIN)
+ (1− piH) 1
u′(cHIN)
(4.39)
This is also shown by graph 4.3, b. We can derive the following inequalities:
WCG > W
Lcontrol
G > W
Hcontrol
G > W
IN
G (4.40)
A positive δ has no impact on W ING , but decreases marginal welfare of the control
mechanisms further. As it enters the budget constraint with q < 1 under 1-type-
control, marginal welfare of 2-type-control decreases more quickly with δ than
marginal welfare of 1-type-control for all G.
Proof. (Proposition 18)
The Proposition follows from Lemma 16 and Proposition 17.
(i) If P (c) > 2, choose q and δ, s.t. WC(G = 0) > WLcontr(G = 0) > WHcontr(G =
0) > W IN(G = 0).
(ii) If P (c) < 2, choose q and δ, s.t. W IN(G = 0) > WLcontr(G = 0) > WHcontr(G =
0) > WC(G = 0).
Given the slope properties and the monotonicity of Welfare w.r.t G and δ, the efficiency
frontiers of the four mechanisms will intersect as depicted in Figure 4.2.
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c
1
u′(.)
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1
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1
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1
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1
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Figure 4.3: Inverse Marginal Utilities and Expected Consumption by Type
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